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1. INTRODUCTION 
'Put simply, the,purpose of the classification certificate is not to guarantee safety, but merely to 
permit Sundance to take adva~t~~~ of the insurance rates available to a classed vessel'. 1 This 
alarming statement made concerning the purpose of classification certificates by Judge Pratt in 
The Sundancer raised serious concerns regarding the reliability of classification society 
certificates. At a time when maritime casualties were escalating; partly due to an ageing 
maritime fleet, 2 the above remark disconcerted classification societies who were attempting to 
restore confidence in their reputation which had been seriously impaired by, inter alia, the 
malpractices of some of the smaller, less scrupulous classification societies. 
In sharp contrast to the above statement by Judge Pratt, came the declaration by Lord Steyn in 
The Nicholas Jf3 that '[t]he role ofN.K.K. (a classification society) is therefore to promote 
.. safety._oflife an~ ships at sea in the public intere_s(_ Clearly there was confusion regarding the 
actual role performed by classification societies. As a result, a 'Joint Working Group on a 
: Stu?y of Issues re Classification Societies'4 ('CSJWG') was appointed by the 'Comite Maritime 
; International' ('CMI'). In fact, the CSJWG reported that 'one of the sources of difficulty has 
been that what the Societies do, and how and on whose behalf they do it, is not set forth to the 
general public in any uniform manner'. 5 
Classification societies have a vital role to play in the maritime industry, especially with an 
increasing number _of responsibilities being delegated to them by flag states, 6 who have neither 
the experti_s~_nor the fi.@ncial s~anding to ensure that vessels flying their flags are in compliance 
with international conventions.7 The continued existence of classification societies is likewise 
essential for_the_ promo.tion__of s ..afo_ty_ of life and property at sea, as well as to conserve our 
sensitive environment and marine resources. 
At the same time, however, classification societies will have to act responsibly and bear their 
proportionate share of liability should they conduct their activities in a negligent manner. We 
owe a responsibility towards our environment and to the many seafarers who risk their lives on 
substandard ships, to ensure that classification societies are provided with the incentives to 
1 Sundance Cruises C01p. v. American Bureau of Shipping, 7 F. 3d 1077 al 1084. 
2 Lloyds List, Africa Weekly, 4 October 1996 at 3. 
3 Marc Rich and Co. v Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd, Bethmarine Co. Ltd and Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (1995] 2 
LI. Rep. 299 at 311. 
4 Bimco Bulletin, Vol. 91, No. 2 of 1996 67. 
5 Ibid at 67. 
6 States on whose shipping registers vessels are entered. Stales which confer their nationality on ships niay 
subject such ships to all their national laws. 
7 Such classification societies may, inter alia, issue International Load Lines Certificates; Safety of Life at Sea 
Ce1tificates; and Marine Pollution Certificates on behalf of their flag states. 
( 
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fulfil their vital roles diligently, without economic pressure by their clients (shipowners) or 
undue restrictions by flag states. 
In this paper, I shall outline the development of classification societies; expand on the various 
theories ofliability against classification societies; analyse relevant cases in different 
jurisdictions; provide arguments for and against the imposition of liability against societies 
and finally; contemplate the future prospects for classification societies. As there i~_ rto case 
law as yet in South Africa pertaining to the liability of classification societies, _I shall 
-- - - - - -
concentrate on th~ global_i~~~~-s _!egarding the potential_ li~~i_li!Y of such societies. 
This paper relates to classification societies 'specifically' as opposed to marine surveyors 
igenerally'. Briefly, a classification society surveyor is usually on board a vessel for a shorter 
period and is engaged specifically to 'inspect' and 'report'; whereas the duties of a marine 
surveyor entail more than 'simply looking over the situation'. 8 This results in a potential 
liability for marine surveyors usually broader than that encountered by classification sodeties. 
Furthermore, classification societiesfrequently have a clause in their classification certificates 
disclaiming liability for negligence, an element often missing from marine surveyor cases. 9 The 
basic principles ofliability relating to both parties, however, remain essentially the same. 
2. THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES10 
2.1 Original role 
Classification societies came into existence during the_l7th and J8th_centuries_out of the needs 
of marine insurers and shipowners. ~hipowners required technical assistance to en_s1:1_re_that 
their vessels were seaworthy, whilst insurers wanted the guarantee that such vessels were 
,--- -
L seaworthy. 11 Such insurers wished to calculate realistic premiums, but had to rely on 'hearsay' 
regarding the condition of vessels which proved extremely_ unreliable. Coffee houses, bars and 
inns near ports became the forums where marine insurers gathered their information, which 
clearly was not conducive to operating a profitable business. 
Due to this undesirable state of affairs, and so as to provide marine insurers with reliable 
information, the first 'classification societies' were founded; namely: Lloyd's Register of 
Shipping (1760); Bureau Veritas (1828); American Bureau of Shipping (1862) and Det 
8 Gordon 'The liability of Marine Surveyors and Ship Classification Societies' (1988) JournalofMaritin1e Law 
and Commerce 301. 
9 fbid at 305. 
10 See generally Boisson 'Classification Societies and Safety at Sea: Back to the basics to prepare for the filtuti, 
(1994) 18 Marine Policy 363. 
11 Donaldson Lord Donaldson's Inquiry 8 April 1994 at 76. 
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Norske Veritas (1864). 12 The purpo~~_ofthe classification societies was to develop and 
,-· ' 
monitor--s-tandaros of design, construction and maintenance of vessels for shipowners and 
insurers. 13 
In order to ensure the complete independence of classification societies, the clients of such 
-· 
societies were not shipowners, as is the case today, but marine underwriters themselves. From 
the information provided by these societies, marine underwriters were in a healthier position to 
accurately assess their risks. Due to the success of classification societies in this respect, such 
societies became extremely effective and profitable. 
2.2 Changing role 
During the latter part of the 19th century, a significant change took place in th~!t,inction of 
classification societies. Shipowners desired 'ratings~14 to be assigned to their vessel's that 
would be valid for a significant period following a comprehensive survey of their vessels. 
Consequently, classification societies issued ratings that would be valid for a fixed period of 
time and, in turn, were paid certain fees for such surveys and certificates. 
The erstwhile independence of classification societies was dwindling - the very organisation r 
whose duty it"wasioensure that vessels maintained their standards was now being paid by 
shipowners for such services. This was clearly a system vulnerable to abuse. On the other 
hand, shipowners required the security provided by such surveys for economic reasons; and 
9la~~iftGation societies obtained a new source of finance which assisted them in making 
te_chn__Q}Qgical _ advancements in their field. 15 
Detailed regulations were drawn up by classification societies regarding surveys, such 
regulations that were used as references in order to determine the safety of vessels. Maritime 
states commenced regulating matters relating to the safety of sea-transport and delegated many 
of their responsibilities to classification societies. As such, classification societies elected to 
sever their ties with marine underwriters and to strengthen their relationship with shipowners. 
12 Supra note 10 at 364-366. 
13 Donaldson op cit at 76. 
14 The original term used for 'classification'. 
15 Supra note 10 at 369. 
{ . 
2.3 Present-day role 
Classification societies are defined as, 
'organised societies which undertake to arrange inspections and advise on the hull and 
machinery of a vessel from its initial stages in new building and thereafter. The 
societies produce a certificate concerning the vessel's seaworthiness in accordance with 
the trade within which it is intended to, or does work'. 16 
\ 
'Classification' does not cover t~~ 'manning' or 'operation' of a particular vessel. Classification ~/ 
societies are predominantly independent, non-profit making organisations and are frequently 
authorised by flag states to ensure that vessels flying their flags are in compliance with 
international conventions. 'Periodic surveys' are undertaken by societies so as to maintain a 
ship's classification, commonly known as 'class'. 17 Information regarding classification is 
confidential and becomes the property of the shipowner. This 'policy of confidentiality' is 
criticised in inany quarters by those who consider that this 'shroud of secrecy' undermines the 
effort~~ of the maritime industry to expose and eradicate substa_!ldard ships. This prompted 
'Fairplay Editorial'18 to comment: 
'Secrecy breeds suspicion, and there has always been too much of it in our industry. 
There are instances where it is both necessary and justified, but not half as many as 
some would have us believe. Take the case of class. Is there any good reason why it 
should not be public knowledge whether a ship is in class or not, and with whom?' 
1 
It is not compulsory for a shipowner to enter his ship with a classification society but, without 
the required certification and classification certificates, he will be unable to provide the 'trading 
certificates' requited by ports-of-call and will likewise be refused insurance covet. He will fi11d 
it impossible to charter-out his vessel as most charter-parties require that a ship be 'in the 
highest class' of the classification society in which she is entered. 
Due to the weak performances of some of the smaller classification societies that lacked the 
required resources and expertise, the larger and more established societies founded 'The 
International Association of Classification Societies' ('IACS'), which internationally represents 
such societies and demands a high level of expertise from its members. Presently, there are 
16 Sullivan The Marine Encyclopaedia Dictionary (1980) at 78. 
17 Being 'in class' indicates that a classification society is satisfied that, at the last periodical survey, the vessel 
complied with the society's rules and regulations. Subject to accidents and poor maintenance, st1ch vessel 
should be in compliance ('in class') until the following survey. 
18 7 NoVelliber 1996 at 3. 
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eleven members19 and two associate members in the IACS.20 Despite the fact that the 
I 
individual societies draw up their particular rules and regulations pertaining to surveys, the 
IACS attempts to harmonise the standards amongst such societies. -Although it is claimed that 
standards are consistent amongst such members, only four IACS societies received 'top marks' 
from the United States Coast Guard with regard to detentions due to Port State Control 
('PSC'). Such societies were Det Norske Veritas; Lloyd's Register of Shipping; American 
Bureau of Shipping; and Nippon Kaiji Kyokai. 21 
· A few of the smaller classification societies founded 'The International Federation of 
Classification Societies' ('IFCS') in 1985. There ate many who believe that these societies are 
substandard. In fact, the United States Coast Guard expresses that its aim is to 'drive owners 
away from using the poorest performing societies and into the safe arms of members of the 
International Association of Classification Societies ('IACS')'.22 
A shipowner is permitted to switch his vessel from one classification society to another. This 
( 
can be for logistic purposes, but likewise can encourage some unscrupulous shipowners to 
indulge in what is commonly termed as 'class-hopping'. 23 In fact, it is alleged that over 4 000 
ships entered into and out ofIACS classification societies between 1995 and 1996.24 Sotne 
shipowners merely wish to have classification certificates to appease charterers and insurers 
whilst, at the same time, paying the lowest possible price for classification surveys. 
With regard to the potential liability of classification societies, Honka25 avers that liability 
·---- - ~ --- --
serves two purposes; namely to restore the damage suffered by an individual and secondly; to ----. ·-• 
prevent similar incidents in the future. Some of the more important functions of classification 
societies are to provide: 'statutory certification .services' (their 'public' role), that stress the 
safety of life at sea and; 'classification services' (their 'private' role), that emphasise the safety 
of property. 26 Governments authorise classification societies to ensure that vessels flying their 
flags are in compliance with the SOLAS Convention, 27 the Load Lines Convention28 a0<;l the 
MARPOL Convention. 29 
19 Namely, American Bureau of Shipping; Bureau Veritas; China Classification Society; Det Norske Veritas; 
Germanischer Lloyd; Korean Registry of Shipping; Lloyds Register of Shipping; Nippon Ka~ji Kyokai; 
Polski Rejestr Statkow; Registro Italiano Navale; and U.S.S.R. Register of Shipping. 
20 Natilely, Deutsche Schiffs - Recision und - Klassifikalion and Jogoslavenski Registar Brodova. 
21 Lloyds List 17 May 1996. 
22 Fairplay Solutions February 1997 at 3. 
23 i.e. The practice by some shipowners of switching classification societies should their vessels be refused 
classification by their current societies due to certain deficiencies not being rectified. 
24 Lloyds List 14 October 1996 at 1. 
25 'The classification system and its problems with special reference to the liability of classification societies' 
(1994) 19 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 1 at 2. 
26 Ibid at 4. 
27 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 64. 
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2.3.1 Reliance placed upon classification societies 
Classification societies are relied upon both to 'certify' the safety of ships in accordance with 
international conventions and to 'classify' ships in accordance with the rules of a particular 
society. Many parties in the maritime industry rely upon such certification and classification, 
including the following: 
Shipowners require certification in order to comply with international conventions and the 
national laws of flag states. Despite the fact that flag states have the responsibility of ensuring 
that vessels flying their flags are in compliance with international conventions, many states wish 
to have as many vessels on their national registers as possible in order to acquire revenue and 
to provide employment possibilities for their citizens. Some flag states have been known to 
iadvertise' their low prices for registration, as well as for their survey and certification work. 30 
Such flag states are commonly referred to ~~ 'flag of convenience' s!ates. This is defined as a 
ship register 'where the flag state does not have the capability of supervising the safety or its 
ships'. 31 A consequence of these 'flag of convenience' states is that shipowners 'shop' for ship 
registers that require the lowest standards of enforcement and involve the least expenses. 
Other flag states simply do not have the desire nor the ability to supervise the certification of 
the vast numbers of vessels flying their flags. Consequently most, if not all,, their survey work 
is delegated to classification societies. Of concern is that evidence has been shown that states 
that delegate a large proportion of their survey and certification work to classification societies 
have a poorer safety record than those that delegate less.32 
' • I 
Shipowners are likewise required to classify their vessels in order to provide their P & I Clubs 
with accurate information regarding the condition of their ships, before such Clubs will 
underwrite a shipowner's civil liability. However, due to a discontentment in classification 
society standards amongst certain P & I Clubs, Clubs such as 'West of England P & I 
Association' produced their own survey programmes that were undertaken by their own 
inspectors. This move was vindicated when inspections of some 'classified' vessels revealed 
serious deficiencies.33 
28 lnLernaLional Convention on Load Lines, Apr. 5, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1957. 
29 International Convenlion for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319, as 
amended by Protocol, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546. 
30 Donaldson op cit at 61. 
31 Jbidat61. 
32 Ibid at 66. 
33 Supra nole 10 at 372. 
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Shipowners wish their vessels to be classified so as to satisfy marine insurers, 34 who require 
that a ship be 'classed' before underwriting the risks associated with such ship. From 1987, 
however, 'The International Union of Marine Insurers' ('IUMI') criticised the 'conflict of 
interest' in the very system of classification itself 35 They disapproved of the fact that 
shipowners employed classification societies to provide them with classification certificates 
and, at the same time, could be required by the societies to_ sp~_nd money to ~!}ha°:_ce the safety 
of their ships which may tempt such shipowners to_ employ other classification s__gcieties: 
Unf01tunately, the prospect oflosing a client often 'encourages' a society to lowerit's 
standards. 
In the aftermath of the loss of 25 bulk carriers in 1990 and 1991, some London insurers 
entrusted ship inspections to 'The Salvage Association'. The targets of these delegated 
inspections were primarily older vessels. The dissatisfaction demonstrated by shipowners and 
classification societies to this move was negated by the statistics published by 'The Salvage 
Association' in September 1993, that manifested that some 80% of the 200 classified ships 
surveyed, required extensive repairs. 36 Presently, however, the world-wid~ 'softening' in 
marine insurance markets has resulted in fewer ships being surveyed by insurers. It appears 
that some insurers are willing to take insurance risks 'at face value' due to the difficult market 
conditions.37 Tony Nunn, the governmental and international affairs advisor of the IUMI, 
contends: 
'In the end, of course, the insurance market does not have to write the risk of a bad 
vessel, but it is absolutely vital that the underwriter knows the background details and 
knows if the shipowner is trying to do something to improve matters'38 
c=Q_~naldson39 opposes the 'trend' of mi.realistically high agreed vessel values ~or insurance 
purposes which may tempt shipowners to 'allow' their vessels to be lost, as an 'escape route' 
out of financial difficulties. Mar_ine insurers rely on the certifica_tes provided by classification _ 
soc1eti_~s when issuing coverage_for_v:essels. Such certificates permit an insurer to make a 
reasonable assumption as to the state of a vessel and it's risk, before covering such vessel.40 
This reliance may be demonstrated by referring to the 'express warranty of classification' 
34 Such as hull and machinery insurers; protection and indemnity insurers; mutual insurers; and cargo 
itisurers. 
35 Supra 11ote 10 at 372. 
36 Ibid at 373. 
37 Lloyds List 18 September 1996 at 14. 
38 Lloyds List: ILU 110th Anniversary. Jmte 1995 at 18. 
39 Op cit at 271. 
40 O'Brie11 'The potential liability of classification societies to marine insurers under United States law' (1995) 7 
U.S.F. Maritime Law Journal 403 at 404. 
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contained in most marine insurance policies. The warranty in an 'Institute Hull Clausei 
stipulates: 
'This insurance shall terminate automatically upon ... change of classification society of 
the vessel, or change, suspension, discontinuance, withdrawal or expiring of the class 
therein'. 41 
The position regarding marine cargo insurers is similar, with their policies ordinarily being 
subject to a classification clause. 42 Should there be a claim by it's assured, a marine insurer will 
cover such loss if the insured can produce a valid classification certificate. Such insurer may, 
however, rely on an 'exclusion' should the vessel have 'fallen out of class'.43 
O'Brien44 raises the question whether an insurer may obtain indemnity from a classification 
society where a valid certificate of classification existed at the time of a loss; and where the 
proximate cause of the loss was a deficiency which constituted a breach of the classification 
society's rules. He provides three instances where a right to indemnity from a classification 
society may arise: 
1) a subrogated action by the insurer of a shipowner; 
2) a direct action in tort by the insurer of a shipowner in order to circumvent contra«:;tual 
limitations; or 
3) a tort action by the cargo insurer where a shipowner has a limited liability below the 
value of the loss, or where recovery against a shipowner may be put at risk. 
: I~ 
Shipowners are usually required to show charterers that their vessels are in the 'highest class1 
of the society in which they are entered. Many charterers, particularly the large oil companies, 
commenced performing their own inspections in the wake of various ecological disasters such 
as the infamous 'Exxon Valdez' pollution. The results of their findings were astonishing. 'Shell 
Oil Company' determined that 20% of the classified oil fleet was substandard with respect to 
cargo-worthiness.45 'BP Oil Company' found the ratio to be 30%, whilst 'Mobil Oil Company' 
established it to be 3 5%. 46 
41 Ibid at 404 citing Hudson and Allen The Institute Clauses Handbook (1986) 88. 
42 Ibid at 405 citing Brown and Nebitt Marine Insurance Cargo Practice (1985) 53. 
43 This may be due to tbe failure by a shipowner to advise his classification society of a change in ownership, 
flag, or as a result of a significant modification to a vessel, or where such vessel is damaged. 
44 Op cit at 405. 
45 Supra note 10 at 374 citing Shell International Marine. 'A study of standards in the oil tanker industry' 
(May 1992). 
46 Ibid at 374 citingUoyds List 2 February 1993. 
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Shipowners depend on financial assistance from banking institutions that, in turn, wish to 
detertnine the 'security' of ships they contemplate financing. This is all the more important in 
jurisdictions such as South Africa, where the 'mortgagee' (the bank) is poorly 'ranked' in 
comparison with other creditors when it requires payment out of the 'fund' following the sale of 
a vessel.47 Due to the different standards prevailing amongst classification societies, banks 
internationally wish to promote transparency by having the condition of ships publicised. 48 
this is clearly impeded by the 'principle of confidentiality' between classification societies and 
shipowners. 
Finally, shipowners have a responsibility towards their' seafarers to ensure that the vessels 
wherein they work are safe and provide adequate living conditions. Tragically seafarers, 
without whom no ship could ply the world's trade, are often the parties most overlooked when 
determining the safety of ships. It is inconceivable that economic prosperity has takeq 
precedence over the safety oflives at sea. Seafarers are frequently in a poor bargaining 
position and will rarely reject employment opportunities due to the apparent unseaworthiness 
of a vessel. Seafarers have the right to assume that the vessels wherein they are employed are 
ctassified, and that such classification certificates are not merely 'rubber stamps'. 
3. THEORIES OF LIABILITY AGAINST CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES 
3.1 Contractual liability 
Whilst a classification society performs its duties, parties such as shipbuilders, shipowners, 
cargo-owners and marine insurers may attempt to hold it liable. The New York Federal Coutt 
asserted in The Continental Insurance Co. v. Daewoo Shipbuilding49 that the duties of 
classification societies were governed by the contract entered into between the parties. These 
duties included taking care in re-examining drawings and in surveying construction work 
before issuing certificates that the vessel conformed to the rules of the classification society. In 
The Great American Insurance Co. v Bureau Veritas50 ('The Great American 1, two duties qf 
classification societies arising from surveying and classifying vessels were recognised: 
'the first duty, as already discussed, is to survey and classify vessels in accordance with 
rules and standards established and promulgated by the society for that purpose. The 
second duty of a classification society is that of due care in detection of defects in the 
ships it surveys and the corollary of notification thereof to the owner ·and charterer'. 51 
47 S11 of the S.A. Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act no. 105 of 1983, as amended. 
48 Supra, note 10 at 374. 
49 USDC, New York, 18th July 1988. 86 - Civ 8255 (RLC). 
50 · 338 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
51 Ibid at 1001. 
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In The Gulf Tampa Drydock Company v. Germanischer Lloyd, 52 where a vessel suffered 
damage as a result of an accident, the court declared: 
'A classification society owes certain duties to a shipowner. Those duties include the 
determination that a ship conforms to certain standards of seaworthiness set by the 
society ... An additional classification society duty is inspection of damaged ships to 
determine whether they continue to meet class standards, and if not, what must be 
undertaken to bring the ship back up to class standards'. 53 
One of the most recent analyses of classification society liability in contract was undertaken in 
The Sundancer. 54 In this case, there was an agreement between the plaintiff shipowner and the 
~~- - -
defendant classification society that the society would provide classification and safety 
certificates. After the sinking of the vessel, the shipowner alleged that his loss had resulted 
from a breach of the classification society's duty and, as such, claimed for breach of contract as 
the classification society had failed to detect a defect in the vessel. Initially, the clas-sification 
society relied on an 'exclusion clause' in the contract whereby all liability on its part was 
excluded. the court rejected this defence, however, as such exclusion clause was deemed to 
be so extension that it breached 'public policy'. 
The classification society further relied on a doctrine advanced in The East River Steamship 
Corporation v Trans-America Delaval, Inc., ('The East River Steamship') 55 which removed 
the shipowner's right to claim in tort. In this latter case, the Supreme Court formulated the 
doctrine that 'a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under negligence or 
strict-liability theory to prevent a product injuring itself .56 The court in The Sundancer57 
stated that The East River Steamship-doctrine would solely apply in cases where parties were 
of 'roughly equal' bargaining power. The court in The Sundancer maintained, however, that 
sµch doctrine would only be utilised to prevent an action in tort where a loss was purely 
economical, but not in cases of non-economical loss such as injury or death. 58 
0'Brien59 believes the current status of U.S.A. law to be that a subrogated shipowner insurer 
(likewise a shipowner in whose shoes the insurer stands) seeking indemnity from a 
classification society for pure economic loss, will be 'estopped' from pursuing an action in to1i; 
whereas in personal injury or death cases, such party will not be 'estopped' from pursuing an 
action either in contract or in tort. He further maintains that, where a subrogated shipowner 
52 634 F. 2d 874 (1981). 
53 Ibid at 875. 
54 Sundance Cruises Corp. v The American Bureau of Shipping 799 F. Supp. 363. 
55 476 U.S. 858, 1986 AMC 2027 (1986). , 
56 Ibid at 871. 
57 Supra note 54 at 384. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Op cit at 40S. 
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insurer wishes to proceed in contract, he will be bound by the agreement between the parties, 
such agreement which may have strict limitations. 
A classification society which negligently classifies a vessel may possibly be held to be in 
breach of contract. Should such breach be proven, however, a shipowner will have the 
additional burden of proving that his damages were 'foreseeable' in the light of the classification 
society's failure to classify his vessel in accordance with its rules. 60 
A classific_ation society may exclude its contractual liability by relying on 'exclusion clauses'. 61 
Classification societies may likewise make provision for 'indemnity clauses', in order to protect 
themselves against third-party claims. Boisson62 states that, in France, classification .societies 
··may limit their liability in contract unless they have been guilty of 'wilful misrepresentation' or 
'gross negligence'. He submits that the position in the UK. is that exemption clauses are 
acceptable should they be reasonable, and that the UK. 'Unfair Contract Term Act' limits the 
effect of such clauses to purely material damages. 63 
In the U.S.A. case, The Amoco Cadiz,64 the court expresses doubt as to 'whether the broad 
exculpatory clause contained within the certificates issued by a classification society is legally 
enforceable'. 65 The court in The Great American66 asserts that a clause by a classification 
society in a contract which 'declines any respon~ibility for errors of judgement, mistakes or 
negl~gence which may be committed by technical or administrative staff or by its agents' is 
overbroad and unenforceable, being contrary to public policy. 
McCormack67 maintains that courts should not impose different terms and conditions on 
contracts than those voluntarily agreed to between parties of equal bargaining po~~. and 
argues further that ;disclaimers' should be upheld. On the other hand, Beck68 believes that 
courts should declare disclaimers of liability, favouring negligent surveyors, to be void. He 
supports this view by reporting that the U.S.A. Supreme Court has held such waivers 
60 Ibid. 
61 So111eti111es referred to as 'release' clauses, 'hold-harmless' clauses or 'exemption clauses'. 
62 Boisson 'Classification Society Liability: Maritime Law principles. Must they be requisitioned?' (1994) 
CMI YEARBOOK 235 at 238. 
63 Ibid. 
64 In re Oil Spill by the 'Amoco Cadiz', 1986 AMC 1945, 1951-1952. 
65 Ibid at 1952. 
66 Op cit at 1010 no. 6. 
67 'Warranties and Disclaimers' (1988) 62 Tulane Law Review 549 at 581. 
68 'Liability of Marine Surveyors for loss of surveyed vessels: When someone other than the Captain goes down 
with the Ship' (1989) 64 Notre Dame Law Review 246 at 269 citing Bisso v Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 
85 (1955). 
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ineffectual in towage contracts, as being contrary to public policy. Starer69 likewise submits 
that classification societies should not be permitted to make use of disclaimers of liability, as 
the public trust their findings to a high degree. 
It is possible for a classification society to avoid liability should a shipowner not comply with 
his obligation to_infon~_~he society of any incidents which could affect his vessel's 'class'. A 
shipowner also has the contractual duty to exercise 'due diligence' to make his vessel seaworthy 
according to the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, such responsibility which may not 
be delegated to a third-party. 70 
3.2 Liability arising from the Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Performance 
It m~y be possible for a shipowner or shipbuilder suing a classification society in contract to 
claim that the society breached an 'implied warranty of workmanlike performance'. This claim ---~--
' differs from a negligence action in that it creates contractual relief for damages, even where a c 
classification society is not negligent. This warranty is referred to as the 'Ryan-doctrine' which , , 
was borne out of Ryan Stevedoring Company v Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation ('Ryan 
StevedoringJ. 71 This case involved a stevedore company which was contracted to load rolls of 
pulpboard on board a vessel. A stevedore failed to immobilise the loaded rolls and, when 
another stevedore from the same company attempted to unload the rolls, the cargo moved and 
seriously injured the luckless stevedore. In The Sundancer,72 the 'Ryan-doctrine' was 
expressed as follows: 
"Simply pi.It, Ryan (and its progeny) stand for the proposition that although a 
shipowner l}as a non-delegable duty of seaworthiness, under certain specific and limited 
circu~stances it can_~43:re i_ts absolute liability. Thus, 'a contractual right to 
indemnification is implied if there are unique special/actors (my emphasis) 
demonstrating that the parties intended that the would-be indemnitor bear the ultimate 
responsibility for the PlaintifPs safety". 
The court concluded that the stevedoring company should bear the costs of its own 
(employee's) negligence. Should a subrogated shipowner insurer (likewise a shipowner) wish 
to obtain an indemnity from a classification society on the basis of the 'Ryan-doctrine', it would 
have to establish that 'unique special factors' 1existed in its relationship with such classification 
69 'The role of classification societies - US perspective'. (1993) Paper delivered at the International Bat 
Association, Section on Business Law, Hong Kong 1-8. 
70 The Riverstone Meat Co. Pty. Ltd. v Lancashire Shipping Co. Ltd. ('The Muncaster Castle'.) [1961] I All 
E.R. 495. 
71 350 US 124, 133-134, 1956 AMC 9 (1955) 
12 Supra note 54 at 384-385 citing Maritime Overseas v N.E. Pet. Indus., 706 F. 2d 349, 353 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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society. 73 The court if!__Byqu__St_eJ,edoring_ contended that the stevedore company's 'warranty of 
workmanlike service' to stow the pulp rolls properly and safely was comparable to a 
manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product. 74 
the applicability of the 'Ryan-doctrine' to classification societies is thoroughly discussed in The 
' . ,,..---- -
Gteat A.11u:.1jca117~ where the court comments that "it is not difficult to make out at least a 
colourable ar~ment for the applicability of 'Ryan' to classification societies in general ... 11 The 
court recognises a duty of '-due care' on the part of classification societies but refuses to elevate · · · ' .) 
. I 
this duty to the status of a warranty. 76 The court in The Great American 77 provides three 
arguments against the applicability of the 'Ryan-doctrine' to classification societies: 
C Firstly, it contends that the burden of ensuring the seaworthiness of a ves_s~L rests with the .. 
shipowner. Furthermore, whilst a shipowner may have little control over the activities of a 
_,_ ·-·--
classification society on board his vessel; such ~ieties rately-,jf ever, create hazards or 
defects by their functions and activities. 78 
' · Secondly, the court argues that Ryan $.tevedoring observes that the 'implied warranty' is 
comparable to the manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product. 79 
Consequently, the comparison tequires that a classification society must produce a 'product'. 
A stevedore creates a 'product' of stowed cargo, whereas the _activities of a clas_sifu:_ation 
society _ney_er create~ ~c..9ndition' on board a vessel which resemble a 'proguct'. A 
classification society cannot create a 'condition' on a vessel; it can merely recommend that the 
shipowner or charterer does so. 80 
i.. · Thirdly, the court acknowledges that the application of the 'Ryan-doctrine' will result in_the 
warranty covering any uns~aworthy condition which may arise on board a surveyed vessel 
which will result in classification societies being the absolute guarantors of the vessels they 
survey. 81 
73 Beck op cit at 409. 
74 Op cit at 133-134. 
75 Op cit at 1014. 
76 Ibid at 1012. 
77 Ibid at 1015. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid citing Ryan Stevedoring op cit at 134. 
so Ibid at 1015. 
81 Ibid. 
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Subsequent hull survey cases have rejected the application of the 'Ryan-doctrine' to contracts 
involving shipowners and classification societies. In The Amoco Cadiz, 82 the court refused to 
apply such doctrine against a classification society. In this case involving one of the largest oil 
spills in history, The American Bureau of Shipping classification society contended that the 
~ipowner was in the best position to avert the loss; and that public policy dictated that 
liability costs should be awarded against shipowners and not classification societies, due to the 
need to create a strong 'merchant marine'. 
Staring83 depicts the Ryan-warranty as; 
'an endangered species of snake which courts do not kill but do not want to handle. 
The obligation which it has expressed is imminently sensible as a duty of some degree, 
but it is difficult to say why it should ever have been a warranty'. 
3.3 Tort liability 
The majority of cases in which recovery is sought from classification societies rely on tort, with 
third-parties claiming to have suffered damage due to classification society negligence. These 
third-parties include insurers; P & I Clubs; charterers; purchasers of vessels; and victims or 
~ 
their dependants, following an accident involving a classified ship. Gordon84 maintains that 
one of the primary reasons that classification society negligence is pleaded is due to the fact 
that societies are frequently included in litigation for a contribution as 'third-party defendants'. 
Boisson85 states that the French system of tort is based upon article 1382 of the 'French Civil 
Code' which stipulates that anyone who commits an injury is responsible for providing 
compensation. He believes this to be unduly strict on classification societies during the sale of 
a vessel, where the purchaser relies on the accuracy of information provided by such society to 
its client, the seller. He avers that a classification society may be held liable even should the 
seller have acted fraudulently and there have been an exclusion clause in the contract, such 
clause not being applicable towards third-parties. He maintains that a classification Society's 
sole defenc_e may be to rely on the ~heory of the 'contractual whole',_out of which its 
obligations towards third-parties will be assessed by referring to previous contractual 
commitments. 86 
82 Op cit at 1947. 
83 'Meeting out Misfortunes: How the Courts are allocating the costs of maritime ittjury in the Eighties' ( 1985) 
45 L.A. Law Review 907 at 915. 
84 Op cit at 303. 




In the U.K., tort liability is pri1Uarily based on the 'duty of care' of persons under certain 
circumstances. 87 In The Morning Watch, 88 the conditions under which classification societies 
were to maintain a duty of care were stipulated by the court. In this case, the motor yacht 
'Morning Watch' was sold in 1985 whilst possessing a valid certificate of classification. 
Thereafter it was found to have some grave defects, including corrosion, which rendered it 
unseaworthy. The purchaser sued Lloyd's Register classification society for economic loss 
suffered as a result of relying on misstatements negligently made, on the ground that the 
society had failed to observe its duty of care. In the Queen's Bench, Judge Phillips asserted 
that: 
'[A] duty of care will only arise where i) it is reasonably foreseeable to the defendant 
that the plaintiff is liable to _rely upon his statement; ii) there is the necessary 
proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant; iii) it is just and reasonable in all the 
circumstances to impose a duty of care on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff. 89 
. 
the court held that there was an insufficient degree of proximity between the purchaser's " 
purely economic loss and the role played by the classification society. The court 
acknowledge~ the plaintifrs submission that the classification society maintained a system of 
classification whereby parties other than owners of classified vessels relied on the fact that 
vessels were maintained 'in class'.90 However, the court declared: 
'[T]he primary purpose of the classification system is, as Lloyd's Rules make plain, to 
enhance the safety of life and property at sea, rather than to protect the economic 
interests of those involved, in one role or another, in shipping'.91 
As the survey had not been undertaken for the sole benefit of the purchaser and; as such 
purchaser was not present when the survey had been requested and; as he was merely one of 
an indeterminate class of persons who may have relied on the survey, the court held that the 
purchaser had failed to establish that the classification society owed him a duty of care when 
the classification certificate was issued.92 
In the recent case of Tli_e Nicholas H, 93 the issues of 'foreseeability' and 'proximity' were 
considered in relation to a classification society. In the Queen's Bench, the court determined 
that 'foreseeability' alone would be sufficient to give rise to a duty of care where the harm 
87 Ibid at 244. 
88 Mario/a Marine Corporation v Lloyd's Register of Shipping. Q.B. (Com. Ct.) 15 Feb 1990, 547 at 549. 
89 Ibid at 556. 
90 Ibid at 559. 
91 ibid. 
92 Ibid at 561. 
93 Marc Rich and Co. v Bishop Rock Marine Co., 2 Lloyds Rep. 481 (1992), 1 Lloyd's Rep. 492 (1994) 
( 
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suffered was physical.94 T_~s decision was reversed, however, in the Court of Appeal95 which 
held that the relationship between the cargo-owners and the classification_society ~8:~__!oQ 
remote and that it_ w~uld_ not be f~ir, just nor reasonable to impose a duty of care on _the 
clas_l!i_f:i.9ation society. The court based this deci_sion upon policy grounds and did _not wisp to 
interfere with what it perceived to ~e the intricate and carefully regulated intematio~itl _code 
-- . 
constituted by the l!agu~ and Hague-Visby Rules.96 . 
O'Brien97 explains that a subrogated shipowner insurer (likewise a shipowner) will have the 
onerous burden of establishing that an unreported or undetected defect by a classification 
society was the proximate cause of a loss; and would have to overcome the policy-based fears 
protecting classification societies. He comments that several factors contribute to a casualty 
and, should a vessel be lost or damaged, it may be impossible to prove that a 'defect' was the 
'sole proximate cause' of the injury. 
As noted previously, the US.A court in The GregLAmgr_ican98 stipulated that a classification 
society obligated itself to perform two duties with due care whilst surveying and classifying a 
vessel: 
'The first duty, as already discussed, is to survey and classify vessels in accordance with ' 
the rules and standards established and promulgated by the society for that purpose. 
The second duty of a classification society is that of due care in detection of defects in 
the ships it surveys and the corollary of notification thereof to the owner and charterer'. 
The District Court99 in The Great American held that the defendant's failure to report 
irregularities with regard to the vessel's traverse bulkhead was not 'apparently' negligent and, 
even should such omission have been negligent, the plaintiff was unable to prove a 'casua.l 
connection' between s~ch failure and the ~essel's sinking. 100 
With regard to the first duty owed by a classification society, the court noted a potentially 
insuperable bar to any recovery for a breach of such duty, namely the long-standing policy that 
~_shipowner l}ad_a non-d~legable duty_to gi_a,tntain a seaworthy_ves~el. A.s_suc_h, a vessel 
o_wn~y never ut!!_i~e _!1 _ship survey nor classification as the basis of a -'due diligence'_def~!!~~ 
th~t _he ~~~_m,ade_ ~s _':es~el seaworthy. 101 S_hould su~h defe~ce be permitted, the 
94 Ibid at 498. 
95 Supra note 3 at 300. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Op cit at 413. 
98 Op cit at 1012. 
99 Ibid at 1011. 
100 Ibid at 1006. 
101 Article III (1) of the Hague Rules as amended by the Brussels Protocol of 1968. 
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accountability of shig9~ners for_ the seaworthiness of their vessels would disappea__r,_ being r 
_ contrary _to_pu~lic policy_ 102 
The court believed that the second duty owed by a classification society provided a sounder 
basis for tort liability. 103 O'Brien104 submits that a subrogated shipowner insurer (likewise a 
shipowner) would have to prove that a defect within the scope of a classification society's rules 
was_4etected and not reported, or not detected at all. Furthermore, such party would have to 
prove that it was r~Q..ably.foreseeable that the failure to detect or report the defect would 
cause such loss, and that it was the 'proximate cause'_ of s-µch loss. O'Brien105 maintains that, 
' ----
should a defect be proven, it will generally follow that such defect is within the classification 
society's all-encompassing rules. He submits that the test of foreseeability will be that of the 
'reasonable surveyor'. As the majority of marine surveyors are master mariners, he believes 
' that such surveyors are aware of the probable consequences of defects in vessels. HJG 
Starer107 is of the opinion that the court in The Great American exposed its unsound 
reasoning. As the vessel was 'lost', he avers that the court absolved the classification society 
from liability by utilising the old liability 'escape-route' of 'no body - no crime ... ' He contends 
that the court held that there was no causal nexus between the classification society's 
negligence and the loss of the vessel, despite the fact that such society had surveyed and 
certified the vessel immediately prior to her last voyage. 108 Starer formulates a pattern 
manifested by the court: 
Firstly, it recognised the existence of a duty of care by the classification society; secondly, it 
expressed concern that classification societies might become the ultimate insurers of the vessels 
they surveyed, motivated by policy fears and; · thirdly, it avoided imposing liability by using the 
aforementioned ~scape-route' of a lack of a causal nexus, virtually impossible to prove / 
following the loss of the vessel. 109 
Nevertheless, Beck110 maintains that the rule in The Great American is significant in that it 
recognises the surveyor's professional duty to discover and warn regarding defects in a vessel. 
102 The Great American op cit at 1012. 
lOl Ibid. 
104 Op cit at 412 citing Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association v. Bureau Veritus (Steamship Mutual~, 
380 F. Supp. 482, 492-493, 1973 AMC 2184 (E.D. La. 1973). 
rn5 Ibid at 412. 
106 Ibid. 
107 'Liability, is it just around the comer? An advocate's view of a classification society and its duty. (1994) 
CMI YEARBOOK 259 at 260. 
108 Jhid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Op cit at 252. 
V 
- 18 -
He submits that this weakens the argument employed by classification societies that they do 
not determine the seaworthiness of ships, but merely classify such vessels. 111 
It is extremely difficult to ascertain whether, in fact, a duty of care has been breached by a 
classification society. If a ship is lost at sea, often the evidence of any negligence by a surveyor 
will be lost with such vessel. In The Great American, 112 experts speculated that the reason for· 
the vessel's sinking was due to the collapse of traverse bulkheads, 113 but this could not be 
proven as the Captain's logbook had been mysteriously lost before the crew were rescued. 
This motivated Beck114 to comment: 
'Cases such as the Great American ... illustrate a disturbing pattern in loss of ship cases: 
namely, the combination of a lack of physical evidence, conflicting opinions df experts 
and questions of intervening cause absolve surveyors from liability almost ab initio'. 
Due to this problem of proof, some plaintiffs have submitted that, utilising 'the unseaworthiness 
doctrine', courts should 'presume' that a surveyor was negligent and that his negligence caused 
the damage to a vessel,_ unless such surveyor could prove 'due diligence' on his part. 115 The 
court in The Great American asserted that '[g]enerally, where a vessel is lost under ordinary 
conditions with no other explanation, the law presumes that she was unseaworthy' .116 
Subsequently, carriers and shippers have maintained that this presumption should apply against 
marine surveyors when classified vessels are lost in fair weather. 
Furthermore, in In re Marine Sulpher Transportation Corporation, 117 it was argued that the 
presumption of unseaworthiness should apply against marine contractors that had been 
responsible for the safety of a lost vessel. In the New York court, ll 8 this presumption was held. 
to apply against a 'designer-converter' of a commercial vessel. This was reversed, however, by 
the Second Circuit court, 119 which held that the unseaworthiness presumption would not apply 
as the duty to provide the crew with a seaworthy vessel was not the responsibility of the 
shipbuilder, such party which had no control over the vessel after her leaving the shipbuilding 
yard. As a result of this decision, courts have subsequently held that the unseaworthiness 
presumption does not apply against land-based marine surveyors. 120 
111 Ibid referring to Gu![ Tampa, 634 F. 2d at 878 citing The Great American op cit. 
112 Op cit at 1006-1007. 
113 A 'bulkhead' is a vertical partition which separates the compartments of a ship. 
114 Op cit at 254. 
115 The Great American op cit at 1008-1009 and Steamship Mutual op cit at 492-493. 
116 Op cit at 1008. 
117 312 F. Supp 1081, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 460 F. 2d 89 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972). 
llB Ibid at 312 F. Supp 1081, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
119 Op cit, 460 F. 2d 89 (2d Cir). 
120 The Great American op cit at 1002 and Steamship Mutual op cit at 493. 
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In The Steamship Mutual, 121 the difficult burden of proving that an undetected defect was the 
proximate cause of a loss was demonstrated. A vessel, shortly after being classified, was lost 
as a result of a defect. Although the court held that the classification society had acted 
negligently, it contended that the plaintiff had failed to prove that such society's negligence was 
the proximate cause of the loss. 122 O'Brien123 reasons that it may not be impossible for a 
subrogated shipowner insurer (likewise a shipowner), who has access to ship maintenance 
documentation and witnesses, to establish the element of proximity. However, he believes it 
will be extremely practically difficult for a cargo insurer to establish a causal nexus due to a 
lack of access to information. Surveyors have frequently been absolved from liability due to 
plaintiffs' difficulties in proving the element of proximity. Beck124 contends that the difficulties 
with regard to the proving of proximity are due to various factors: 
·"-' fir~fly, ~!? _!}laintains that the consequences of_an improper survey are-ofl:enJJnfore.§~~able. i25 
. \ . --
lrkT;he Wagon Mound I, 126 it is stipulated that a party's liability depends on 'whether the 
damage is of such a kind as a reasonable man should have foreseen'. 127 In this case, 
shipbuilders sued a shipowner when his freighter discharged oil into a port, subsequently 
igniting and damaging a shipbuilder's wharf 
- Secondly, he reasons that the loss of a vessel is commonly a result of 'an act of God', which 
would be a question of 'fact'. 128 Should there be speculation that a storm caused or contributed 
to the loss of a vessel, a surveyor would not be held liable even should concrete evidence be 
provided that the vessel's damage was due to the surveyor's negligence. 129 
Thirdly, a ship?wner's failure to _!"epair a 'known' defect may constitute an 'intervening 
cause'. 130 As a shipowner has the non:-delegable duty of_making his_vessel.seawort}J.y, cqurts - : 
- -- """=::..::.. - -- - - ~ - - -
aver that a shipowner's failure to prevent a_los~ constitutes an.intervening _cause. 131 In The ------· . . ~- --- - --
Ai110co Cadiz, 132 the plaintiff marine surveyors sought a partial summary judgement to absolve 
themselves from liability as they alleged that the shipowner's conduct with regard to the 
vessel's damage constituted an intervening cause. This application was refused, however, by 
121 Op cit. 
122 Ibid at 491. 
123 Op cit at 414. 
124 Op cit at 256. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) v Marts Dock and Engineering Co. 1961 App. Cas. 388 (P.C. 1961). 
121 Ibid at 426. 
128 Beck op cit at 257. 
129 Ibid at 258 .. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Op cit. 
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the court which stated: 
'[It] cannot be said at this point ... that [the shipowner's] failure to perform certain 
maintenance on [the ship] and to rectify those problems about which it had knowledge 
superseded the other facts ... Consequently, the ABS is not entitled to summary 
judgement on this basis'. 133 
3.4 Liability as a result of Negligent Misrepresentation 
It may be possible for parties to sue classification societies for the tortious action of 'negligent 
misrepresentation'. In The Sundancer, 134 a shipowner sued his classification society for 
negligent misrepresentation. The District Court devised a four-part test135 which a plaintiff 
would have to satisfy in order to succeed in a claim of negligent misrepresentation: 
The plaintiff would have to establish that (1) the defendant, at the plaintiffs request, provided 
information for its direction; (2) such defendant failed to use reasonable care in so doing; (3) 
such defendant knew that the plaintiff would rely on the information for specific purposes; and 
(4) the plaintiff suffered economic loss as it relied on such information. 
The District Court held that the second, third and fourth elements had been established, but 
stated that there was no evidence concerning the first requirement that the insurer had 
requested the classification society to provide it with any information for its guidance. 136 
O'Brien137 maintains that a subrogated shipowner insurer should have no difficulty in 
establishing the first requirement, as such insurer takes the place of the shipowner who has 
requested a classification society to conduct a survey of his vessel. He believes, however, that 
an insurer suing 'directly' may not satisfy the first requirement as it could be argued that the 
classification was requested by the insurer due to its requirement that classification be a pre- -
requisite to coverage. 138 He further avers that a subrogated shipowner insurer (likewise a 
shipowner) may not succeed with the fourth requirement as it militated against the non-
delegable duty of the shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel. 139 On the other hand, an 
insurer suing directly may succeed should it overcome the first requirement that a classification 
society must provide a certificate at an insurer's request and for its guidance. 140 
133 Ibid at 1955. 
134 Supra note 54. 
135lbid at 381. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Op cit at 414. 
138 Ibid at 414-415. 




3.5 Liability acting on behalf of Administrations 
Boisson considers that a classification society may find itselfliable in several ways141 whilst 
fulfilling its statutory function of applying national and international regulations on behalf of 
state administrations: 
Firstly, this applies to states that delegate their powers to classification societies to perform 
surveys and inspections of vessels flying their flags. This will fall under the state's 
'administrative liability' even though the 'public service' is provided by a 'private entity', a' 
classification society;-- Secondly, 'civil liability' may be invoked against classification societies 
/ 
by their clients and third-parties should faults be committed whilst performing a statutory 
service. Certai~\legislative immunities may, however, be provided by flag states in these 
circumstances. Thirdly, a classification society surveyor may be charged before criminal (" 
jurisdictions should his negligence amount to a criminal offence. This will result in personal 
liability, which will not be covered by insurance. 
With regard to Boisson's first scenario of 'administrative liability'; 142 for a long period, the legal 
relationships between flag states and classification societies were regulated very loosely by 
states that simply bestowed upon certain classification societies the authority to carry out their 
duties. During the 1980's, agreements were concluded between flag states and classification 
societies defining their legal relationships. 143 These agreements have evolved in order to 
prevent any disagreement between the parties and to stipulate the maximum amounts for which 
classification societies could be held liable. 144 The 'International Maritime Organisation' 
('IM0')145 has provided guidelines for the authorisation of organisations acting on behalf of 
state administrations. The Commission of European Communities has likewise submitted a 
draft directive on common rules and standards for ship inspections and survey organisation. 146 
This directive does not, however, contain any clauses perta1ning to liability. 
With regard to Boisson's second scenario involving 'civil liability', classification societies are 
provided with some legal protection by flag states. Legislative immunity prevents legal 
proceedings against a flag state and its agents (such as classification societies) before the 
courts of foreign states. The Bahamas, for instance, stipulates that a government appointee (an 
authorised classification surveyor) is immunised fromJiability for issuing statutory certificates 
141 Supra note 62 at 247. 
142 Ibid at 248. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
14S Resolution A 739 of 4 November 1993. 
146 Supra note 62 at 248-249. 
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'in good faith'. 147 In The Sundancer, 148 the court determined that classification societies were 
entitled to legislative immunity. It held that 'Bahamian law' applied to the classification and 
certification contract as solely the flag state, the Bahamas, provided a 'stable connection' in 
order to determine the law of the contract. Honka149 aptly criticises this decision by stating: 
'It seems a strange policy to provide extensive legislative protection to those civil 
servants and governmental appointees with responsibility for protecting life and 
property at sea without giving a court the option to decide whether liability exists'. 
He contends further that '[a] purely national immunity system seriously infringes on the 
convention-based, mandatory, protective safety-at-sea-network and its basic aimsi. 150 Honka 
argues that, in international disputes, the ~pplicability of legislative immunity should derive 
fro~. 'conflict of la~• rules should such immunity not come out of 'customary international 
law'. 151 Accordingly, the law of the state in which the immunity legislation predominates, 
should apply. He asserts, however, that the principle of 'ordre public'152 could negate this 
legislative protection as it could be argued that legislative immunity was in conflict with the 
public policy in the state of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. 153 
In T_he Scandinavian Sta!:_154 a car ferry, subsequent to being converted from a cruise vessel, 
caught fire in 1990 leaving 159 dead and many injured. The plaintiffs argued that the 
classification society surveyor, in carrying out surveys for classification and statutory 
certificates, had failed to report deficiencies which contributed to the rapid spread of the fire. 
Their claim was, inter alia, dismissed on the grounds oflegislative immunity. Bahamian law, 
the law of the flag, was held to govern the dispute, such law which afforded immunity to its 
authorised classification societies. 
1 
A consequence ofBoisson's third scenario of 'criminal liability'155 is that a classification society 
s1,1rvey@r may be charged with criminal liability even though he acts on behalf of the authorities 
of a state. Boisson comments that, although this sanction is seldom invoked, surveyors in 
France have been held criminally liable following a fatal accident involving a surveyed vessel. 156 
He submits that, following the guilty decision relating to the sinking of the dredger, 1The Cap 
147 S 278 of the Bahamian Merchant Shipping Act of 1976. 
148 Supra note 54 at 391-392. 
149 Op cit at 18. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Acts contrary to public policy; Ibid at 19. 
t 53 Ibid at 19. 
154 JfumbertoArgondona v Lloyd's Register of Shipping; Supra note 62 at 249. 
155 Supra note 62 at 250. 
156 Ibid; Based on article 221-226 of the French Penal Code which punishes those guilty of manslaughter 
through negligence, error or a failure to observe rules. 
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de La Hague', French criminal judges have been unconcerned at holding classification societies 
criminally liable. 157 
, In a very recent case158 involving a criminal charge against the oldest U.K. classification 
! society, Lloyd's Register, such society admitted liability for failing to ensure the safety of the 
. public under s 3(1) of the U.K. Health and Safety Act of 1974. In this case, employees of 
, Lloyd's Register were charged with 'gross negligence' for failing to survey a passenger 
: walkway properly, which subsequently collapsed killing 6 people and injuring 7 others. In 
_ j some quarters, this case is seen as a Joi:ig-aw~ited decision where a c_lassificati9n society is held 
, _liable for_ certifying an object, which subsequently is held to be unsafe. 159 
4. SIGNIFICANT CASE LAW OF VARIO US JURISDICTIONS 
4.1 U.S.A. 
4.1.1 Tl,e Sundancerl60 
4,1.1.1 Facts 
In this case, the contractual liability of a classification society, the American Bureau of 
Shipping, ('ABS') was considered in relation to its clients ('Sundance'), the owners of 'The 
Sundancer'. 
Sundance (plaintiff) converted a passenger ferry into a luxury passenger cruise vessel and 
employed ABS (defendant) to provide survey certificates for insurance purposes and the 
legislative safety certificate required by the flag state, the Bahamas. Very shortly after being 
inspected and certified by ABS, the vessel ran aground off the coast of British Columbia and 
tore a hole in her hull. Although the evacuation procedure was successful, some of the 
roughly 500 passengers sustained personal injuries, with many suffering from emotional shock. 
Sundance sued ABS due to its failure to detect the absence of valves in the vessel's 'grey-water 
piping system' (a 'SOLAS' violation) and the presence of two ~oles in a bulkhead, which 
Sundance alleged had led to the vessel's sinking. Sundance argued that neither violation had 
been reported by ABS161 and that such vessel should have kept afloat ,despite the flooding of -
two of her thirteen watertight compartments. 
157 Ibid at 250. 
158 The already infamous Ramsgate Trial; Lloyds List 1 March 1997 at 1. 
159 Faimlay Editorial 6 March 1997 at 4. 
160 Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping, 799 F.Supp. 363, 1992 AMC 2946 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992), aff1d, 7 F. 3d 1077, 1994 AMC 1(2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1399 (1994). 
161 Supra note 1 at 1080. 
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Sundance contended that, should ABS not have been negligent, the defects which caused the 
vessel to sink would have been discovered and reported. Accordingly, such defects would 
have to have been rectified before 'The Sundancer' would have been classified and she would 
not have sailed on her fateful voyage. Sundance sought compensatory damages in excess of 
US $64 000 000 and punitive damages of US $200 000 000. 
The Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals162 held that Sundance's claim against the 
ABS should fail. The court asserted that Bahamian law immunised ABS for its 'good faith' 
conduct in issuing the statutory safety certificate163 and, regarding the issuance of the 
classification certificate, it determined that Sundance had not provided any proof that it had 
suffered damage due to the granting of such certificate. 164 
4.1.1.2 An analysis of the applicable courts' reasons 
Sunqance accepted responsibility for the ship's sinking, but averred that such vessel would not 
have sunk but for ABS's negligence, gross negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of 
contract and breach of the 'Ryan' implied warranty of workmanlike performance in issuing the 
statutory safety certificates for the vessel. 165 
The District Court held that the law of 'The Sundancer's' 'flag', Bahamian law, protected ABS 
with immunity for its actions in issuing the SOLAS and Load Lines certificate on behalf of the 
Bahamian government. 166 It declared that no evidence had been provided that ABS had been 
'grossly negligent' and, furthermore, Sundance could not prove 'negligent misrepresentation' as 
there was not 'a scintilla of evidence ... that plaintiff had asked defendant to provide it with any 
information for its guidance'. 167 The court likewise submitted that no 'Ryan' implied warranty 
existed with regard to ship inspections. 168 
162 Supra note 1 at 1085. 
163 Ibid at 1083. 
164 Ibid at 1084. 
165 Ibid at 1080; See Ryan Stevedoring op cit. 
166 Supra note 54 at 392. 
167 Ibid at 382. 
168 Ibid at 385-386. 
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The chief reasons provided by the U.S. Court of Appeals169 in dismissing Sundance's claim 
were the following: 
I) TJ1~~ourt _determined that Sundance had fail~~ to demonstrate that it had suffered 'damage' 
flowing out of the issuan~e of the classific~tion certificate by ~S. 170 
2) It also asserted that a shipowner was not entitled to rely on a classification certificate as a 
guarantee that his vessel was soundly constructed. 171 Cane172 concedes that the liability of a . -- ... ____ .. ~ .. - -
classification society should not be 'strict', but should be for 'negligence'. 173 In The Sundancer, 
however, Cane pertinently points out that negligence on the part of the classification society 
was 'assumed' for the purposes of the action against them, and did not have to be proven. 174 
3) The court further maintained that the disparity between the fees charged by ABS (US $_8_~_000)._ 
and the damages claimed by Sundance demonstrated that the classification society could not 
~ - ~ - ~ - ~ - ·-- . 
have intended to assume the risk ofloss of the vessel. 175 The court concluded that Sundance 
--- ·---- - - . - - - ·- . . -
~ould not hold ABS liable for an amount ~hich was 700 times that of the fee for the 
dassification co~t~act. 176 Cane177 views this as a weak argument. 178 He contends that this 
does not take into account the fact that the classification society may have been covered by 
liability insurance and, as such, the disparity between the amounts may be misleading. He 
pursuasively argues that the fee charged may well have made allowance for the premium of the 
appropriate liability insurance. 179 
On the other hand, it may be argued by classification societies that insurers may see them as a 
classic case of 'bad insurance risk' due to their potentially great exposure. 180 Accordingly, 
insurance premiums may be greatly increased, such costs which will be handed over by 
societies to shipowners who are already insured. Cane deems it undesirable to have 'double 
insurance' against the same loss and maintains that it could be argued that insurance cover 
should be taken out by the party who could do so more efficiently, being the shipowner. 181 
169 Supra ilole 54. 
170 Ibid at 1084. 
171 Ibid. 
172 'The liability of classification societies' (1994) Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 363. 
173 Ibid at 367. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Supra t1OLe 1 at 1084. 
176 Ibid at 1085. 
177 Op cit. 
178 Ibid at 368. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Beck op cit at 268. 
181 Op cit at 368. 
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' 
The decision in The Sundancer'was based on an unwillingness to disturb what the court 
believed to be settled patterns of risk-sharing amongst commercial parties. Cane182 retorts by 
arguing that the manner in which parties of roughly equal bargaining strength distribute the risk 
of transactions amongst themselves should not be tampe~ed with. Should a classification 
society believe that the distribution of risks in a contract are unequal, it could attempt to 
negotiate an immunity with the shipowner. Starer183 likewise maintains that 'basic contractual 
law principles provide that courts should not and may not (my emphasis) question the 
adequacy of consideration'. 
4) The court found it significant that Sundance, as shipowner, was ultimately responsible for and 
in control of the activities on board 'The .Sundancet'. It held that Sundance had full 
responsibility for the conversion, repairs and maintenance of the vessel. This ongoing 
responsibility was supplemented by th~ o:wner's non-delegabl~ cl!ltY to provide a seaworthy 
vess~l. 184 AB~ ~ould no! be deemed _to have acquir_ed Sundance's duties by inspe<?ting th~ 
ve~~d .and issuing a classification certificate. Starer185 disagrees that finding classification 
societies liable negates or lessens this duty. He reasons that shipowners employ classification 
societies for their expertise in order to advise such owners as to how they may comply with 
their duty to provide seaworthy vessels. 186 Owners simply do not have the technical 
knowledge to ascertain whether their vessels are seaworthy or not. The certificates provided 
by classification societies are intended to assure the shipowner that he has complied with his 
non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. Starer aptly questions why a shipowner 
should be held liable for a negligent survey performed by a creditable company (a classification 
society) which he has both paid for and rdied upon. 187 
5) The court further declared that ABS was entitled to rely on the immunity provided by th~ flag 
state, the Bahamas. 188 Starer questions this finding as the Bahamian Statute had, until then, 
not been interpreted in any Bahamian judgement; nor had it been raised as a defence by ABS; 
nor dealt with during the five years of discovery! 189 
6) The court proceeded to make the aggravating statement that the purpose of a classification 
certificate ·~as_~ot t~-~ua;antee safety, but merely to ~-~r~~-Su~dance totake advantage or the 
insurance rates available to a classified vessel. 190 This statement motivated 'Lloyds List' to 
182 Jhid at 368-369. 
183 Supra note 107 at 262. 
184 Supta note 1 at 1084; See also The Great American op cit. 
185 Supra 11ote 107 at 262. 
186 Jbid. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Supra note 1 at 1083. 
189 Supra note 107 at 261. 





remark: 'At the time, one insurer, perhaps with a modicum of understatement, described this 
as a serious denigration of the value of class certificates' .191 Cane likewise believes this 
statement by the court to be inappropriate as, the very reason why classified vessels obtain low 
premiums, is due to the fact that insurers rely on the authenticity of classification 
certificates. 192 Should insurers believe otherwise, they would utilise their own surveyors or 
adjust their insurance premiums accordingly. Starer193 alleges that 'arcane policy', rather than a 
proper application of legal theory, is behind the courts' reluctance to impose liability on 
classification societies, even though such societies have a recognised duty tel exercise due care 
whilst performing their services. 
4.1.2 The Happy Sprite And Tlte .Tolly Sprite194 
This case is important in demonstrating that, where services provided by classification societies 
involve such a high degree of expertise that shipowners rely upon such services, and third-
parties consequently act upon the reliance by such shipowners, a duty of care should be ,,,{ ~ ✓ 
recognised, with regard to such classification societies. -e,o/' _p.,,.,,6;,i.f,_ 
( re,,(,~ 7~ 4::J 
Qt,r) 
ABS, the defendant, was held negligent 'in tort' for issuing certificates to the vessels 'The 
Happy Sprite' and 'The Jolly Sprite', such certificates which understated their Suez Canal 
tonnage measurements by some 24%. The shipowners had paid US $200 000 in settlement to 
the time charterers of the vessels, 'Somerelf1, who had suffered loss subsequent to relying on 
the incorrect measurements when entering into voyage charte~ arrangements with third-parties. 
Accordingly the shipowners, as plaintiffs, proceeded with an action for indemnification ag~inst 
ABS. 
The Suez Canal authorities had authorised ABS to issue their tonnage certificates, 195 such 
society which was chosen by the shipbuilders and shipowners due to its efficiency and 
reliability. A certain Mr Boyle from ABS failed to detect an error in the Suez Canal tonnage 
computation, which omitted the tonnage of the water ballast tanks from the underdeck 
tonnage. Mr Boyle conceded that his mistake in computing the incorrect underdeck tonnage 
was a 'human error1.196 
191 23 January 1997 at 5. 
192 Op cit at 369. 
193 Supra note 107 at 259. 
194 Somere?f. Elf Union and Fairfield Maxwell Services Ltd. v the American Bureau of Shipping, Civil no. 86. 
4615, U.N.D.C. District of New Jersey, 1989 A.M.C. 2330, September 1, 1989; reported in LexisMNeXis, 1989 
American Maritime Cases, 211d item of level 1 at 2. 
195 Which would determine the amount a vessel would have to pay the Suez Canal Authorities to pass through 
the Suez Caimi. 
196 Op cit at 5. 
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The court held that ABS had failed to exercise 'reasonable care' in preparing the certificates. 
The court 197 substantiated this by asserting: 
'Calculation of vessel tonnages, including Suez Canal tonnages, requires training and 
expertise beyond that possessed by a vessel owner or manager's employees. Vessel 
owners, as well as authorising national governments and agencies themselves, rely 
upon experts in the field, like ABS, to calculate and certify vessel tonnages, including 
Suez Canal tonnages ... ABS understood that the Suez Canal special tonnage 
certificates ... could be used for the benefit of other parties in the maritime industry 
with an obvious need to rely on such certificates; specifically, time charterers and 
voyage charterers, as well as owners'. 198 
The court granted the shipowners tort-based indemnity from ABS in this case a:s no provision 
had been made for contractual indemnity. 199 It noted that the purpose of such indemnity was 
to shift the burden of compensating the victim of a tort to the party who was chiefly 
responsible for such tort; in this instance ABS.200 The court was satisfied that ABS had, in 
fact, committed the tort of 'negligent misrepresentation'. 201 All of the elements of the 
negligent misrepresentation tort were proven at the trial; namely: 202 
1) ABS provided the plaintiffs with false information; 
2) ABS did not exercise reasonable care in gathering such information; 
3) The plaintiffs relied on the incorrect information in a transaction which ABS knew 
such information could influence; and 
4) Consequently, the plaintiffs suffered monetary loss. 
A duty of care was held to extend to everybody who would forseeably rely on the tonnage 
certificate; in this case the voyage charterers. 203 The basis of the court's decision was that 
ABS had held itself out to the industry to be an expert, and that the industry had reasonably 
relied on such party for that objective.204 As ABS had issued the tonnage certificate without a 
'disclaimer' for negligence, the court entered judgement in favour of the shipowners for US 
$200 000; with costs. 
197 Ibid at 6. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid at 12. 
200 Ibid at 13. 
201 Ibid. 
202 ibid at 14. 
203 Ibid at 6. 
204 Ibid. 
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Surprisingly, this decision has not received much attention in subsequent cases dealing with 
actions in tort against classification societies for negligent misrepresentation. It was, however, 
cited as authority by the plaintiff in The Sundancer205 in order to hold ABS liable for negligent 
misrepresentation.206 The court in The Sundancer dismissed this authority by asserting that the 
shipowners had not utilised ABS for the 'doing of anything', but merely to calculate the 
tonnage of their two vessels in order to correctly ascertain the fees payable for transit through 
the Suez Canal.207 Such court maintained: 208 
"In the case now before us, plaintiff had not asked for 'guidance' of any sort but simply 
for certificates that would entitle it to procure insurance and operate its vessel. 11 
Sundance confro11ted this view by the court by alleging that the tonnage calculations had been 
required with regard to ABS's issuance of certificates under 'The International Convention on 
Tonnage', but to no avail.2°9 
4.2 U.K. 
4.2.1 Tlte Nicltolas JJ210 
4.2.1.1 Facts 
The Nicholas JP11 was a classic example of a case regarding the potential liability of 1 ..,..{ Yo f ,-t-2 7 
classification societies in relation ~o third-parties. This case was viewed as a victory in mahy a-/- c · s' 
- quart~ by classillcation societies, with Lord Steyn proclaiming in the House ofLords:212 (-:;, e-<. ..,,.c:r).,.,,7 
ra-v c.~ 
'Owners have apparently never successfully sued a classification society in England or 
elsewhere for breach of a contractual or tortious duty in and about the performance of 
their contractual engagement for a survey of a damaged vessel'. 
The vessel, 'The Nicholas H', loaded cargo in Peru and Chile for carriage to Italy and the 
U.S.S.R. in early 1986. During her voyage, the vessel deviated to Puerto Rico due to a crack 
in her hull. Further cracks started developing whilst at anchor and the vessel's classification 
society, Nippon Kaiji Kyokai ('NKK'), was engaged to survey her. The surveyor, a certain Mr 
205 Supra note 54. 




i 10 Marc Rich and Co. v Bishop Rock Marine Co., [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 481 (Q.B.); [1994] 1 Lloyds Rep. 492 
(C.A.); [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 299 (H.L.) 
211 Ibid. 
212 Supra note 3 at 310. 
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Ducat; discovered significant cracks in the shell-plating of the vessel. As such, he 
recommended immediate, permanent repairs which were possible at such port, but which 
would have been costly as the vessel would have had to discharge and thereafter reload her 
cargo. 
After temporary repairs were effected to the vessel, Mr Ducat issued a 'second report' wherein 
he recommended that such vessel proceed on her intended voyage to the discharge port, where 
the temporary repairs could further be assessed. He recommended that the vessel beretained 
as 'classed' subject to this further assessment taking place. The day following her departure 
from Puerto Rico, 'The Nicholas H' reported that her temporary welding had cracked and, 
following the rescue of her crew, she sank in the Atlantic Ocean with the loss of all her cargo. 
The cargo-owners agreed to a settlement figure of US $500 000 with the shipowner, being the 
upper-limit of the shipowner's liability according to the Hague Rules.213 Such cargo-owners 
('the plaintiffs') subsequently sued N.K.K. ('the defendant') in tort for the balance of their loss, 
being US $5.5 million, with interest.214 The cargo-owners argued that the surveyor had 
negligently approved the temporary repairs and, had such approval not been granted, the vessel 
would not have sailed and thus the cargo would not have been lost. 215 
The question raised in this case was whether a cl_assification society could be held liable in tort 
to cargo-owners who suffered a loss due to the society's negligence in issuing a classification 
certificate.216 In the Queen's Bench Division,217 Mr Justice Hirst held that_ the cla_ssification 
society owed a duty of care to the cargo-owners. This decision was reversed in the Court of 
- . ---- ·--~- - --
11~peal,218 which reversal was affirmed in the House ofL.~rds.219 Lord Lloyd of Berwick was 
the sole dissenting opinion in the House of Lords hearing. 
The preliminary issue ordered for trial was whether, on the facts pleaded, the classification - - - ~ --~------ -
society owed a duty of care to the cargo-owners which could give rise to a liability in 
... ...,._ .,._, . -- --- --- -- - -----· 
damages. 220 The plaintiffs alleged that, in order to establish a duty of care, they merely had to 
213 Supra note 3 at 299. 
214lhid. 
215 Ibid at 303. 
216 Ibid at 310. 
217 [1992) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 481 (Q.B.). 
218 [1994), I Lloyd's Rep. 492 (C.A.). 
219 Supra note 3. 
220 Supi'a note 217 at 481. 
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prove:221 
'(i) foreseeability that lack of care might result in harm and (ii) ownership or an appropriate 
possessory interest in the property physically damaged or lost; and that there was no 
need to make good the additional criteria which applied in cases of economic los~ i.e. 
(iii) proximity and (iv) that it would be fair, just and reasonable on the facts of the case 
to impose a duty of care'. 
4.2.1.2 An analysis of the majority judgement of the House of Lords 
Lord Steyn concludes for the House of Lords that the claim by the cargo-owners should fail. 222 
In making this decision he submits that, '[i]n England no classification society, engaged by 
• R O - p .... 
~wners _to p«:_r_form a survey, has ever been held liable to cargo-own~rs on t~e ground _of a 
careless conduct of any survey. '223 He further declares that a classification society would not 
.. --- - - ------ --- -
2,e responsible to the cargo-owners in tort, even should such society be negligent in declaring a 
••- .. ----- ---- •-~• ,-.. ' - •• - -•R• 
ship seaworthy. This would be the case even where, following a survey,.a vessel proll).ptly ~ails ------ -- -- -
and sinks! Such society may only be responsible towards the shipowner with whom it has a 
contract. ----- --,. 
Lord Steyn rejects the submission by the cargo-owners that, where a plaintiff has a prbprietary 
or possessory interest in cases of physical damage to property, the only requirement it is 
required to fulfil is proof of 'reasonable foreseeability'. 224 He maintains that it is 'settled law' 
that, bVer and above the elements of foreseeability and proximity; considerations of fairness, -------- -- -- - -- -·-· -- . 
justice and reasonableness are likewise relevant to all cases irrespective of the nature of harm 
-~" , ~ - a - -~" -•~ T~W--- ~--~'--•-"'- ...... 
s~~e.!~~_by the_plaintiff.225 Tetley226 criticises this approach by the House ofLords: 
'This requisite was added to tort law by the House of Lords in questions of economic 
loss without physical damage, in order to avoid opening the floodgates to multitudes of 
claims'. 
Tetley further argues that this was a new departure as many common-law jurisdictions, 
including Canada, have not adopted this requirement even with respect to economic loss.227 
221 Jbid. 
222 Supra note 3 at 317. 
223 Ibid at 310. 
224 Ibid al 312. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Fairplay Editorial 28 March 1996 at 14. 
227 Ibid. 
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Lord Steyn asserts that the shipo~s were_primarily responsible for their _vess~!~ailiug_in_c! ·--- - ---
seaworthy_c9njition, with the role of the classification society.surveyor_b~ei~g_a__s!:,lbsidiary ~ 
£_@ .. E-8 It was held by the House of Lords that there had been no contact whatsoever between 
the cargo-owners and the classification society, with the cargo-owners merely relying on the 
-------·- -- ------- -----------~-- -- -
shipowners to keep their vessel seaworthy and to take care of the cargo. 229 Lord Steyn 
supports the ;i~; ~fLord Justice Saville 1n-the Court of Appeal~~ho ~aintained that it 
counted against the cargo-owners that no evidence had been provided that they were even 
aware that the classification society had been summoned to survey the vessel.23° Cane231 
' 
contends that what actually concerned Lord Justice Saville was that he believed that the 
primary responsibility for the safety of the cargo rested with the shipowners, and not with the -- - ~.- .. 
dassification society. ---------- --
Cane maintains that one should not enquire as to whether a plaintifPs loss 'is' due to his reliance 
on the conduct of a classification society, but that it should be value judgement as to whether a 
classification society 'ought' to be liable to a plaintiff. 232 He concedes, however, that in terms 
of promoting economic efficiency in the connected markets of the carriage of goods by sea and 
ship classification, there were some good arguments in favour of the Court of Appeal's 
decision, such decision which was upheld by the House ofLords.233 
With regard to the issue of proximity, Lord Steyn concurs with the finding of the Court of 
Appeal that there was an insufficient relationship o~ P!_oximity J?et~een the carg~-owners and 
~he _classification_s_~ie!y. 234 France235 believes that the test for proximity was satisfied in this 
case. He argues that the risk to the cargo would have been reduced had the vessel not sailed 
urttil further repairs were effected. 236 He elaborates:237 
'If a duty of care to cargo in these circumstances had ultimately been affirmed, can 
anyone doubt that classification societies would be encouraged to improve their internal 
procedures aimed at preventing vessels from sailing in similar circumstances without a 
more thorough condition assessment or to devise procedures to ensure immediate 
support and authority to beleaguered, on-site surveyors?' 
228 Supra note 3 at 314. 
229 Ibid, 
230 Ibid. 
i 3I Op cit at 370. 
232 Jbid. 
233 Ibid at 376 .. 
234 Supra note 3 at 314. 
235 'Classification Societies: their liability -An American lawyer's point of view in light of recent judgements' 
(1996) 2 the International Journal of Shipping Law 67. 
236 ibid at 71. 
237 Ibid. 
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Lord Steyn is concerned that, should a duty of care be held to exist in this case, the potenti~l 
exposure of classification societies to claims by cargo-owners would be vast and would_ enable_ 
cargo-owners to disturb the balance created by the Hague, Hague-Visby and tonnage limitation 
....... ..... . -
_provisions. 238 This w_ould_~llQW cargo-owners, in effect, to reco~r i!!_ tort fro_m ~ 'periP.herat 
r.... 0 • - • • & ,,.. "•• • .-,_ - - • 
P!lrtY ( classification societies). 239 The court was reluctant to interfere with this unive~sa~ly 
accepted system oflaw, which placed the primary duty of care on the shipowner and not 011 the 
classification society which was foreign to the contract of carriage and which could not benefit .... ·- -~- ""'• 
:from the limitation of liability provisions. 
Lord Steyn reasons that the recognition of a duty of care will exp~s~_classification societies to 
large claims, resulting in increased insurance costs for societies. 240 He claims that the higher - ----- - •- ------ ' .. 
costs_ o! _l~abil~~ies would ultimately _be passed back to the_s~IJ~W~e_r.241 France questions this 
viewpoint by the House ofLords.242 He contends that, should 'The Nicholas H' have been 
unseaworthy when she departed from Puerto Rico, and her owners were a party to such 
unseaworthiness, such shipowners would then not be entitled to limit their liability and the 
cargo 'interests' would be able to recover in full, or in accordance with the customary freight 
unit limitation provisions in the Hague Rules.243 He maintains that, should there have been no 
assets besides the vessel, the P&I Club rule which requires its members to pay before being 
indemnified would have resulted in the risk of loss in reality falling on the cargo-insurers; 
which was contrary to the liability scheme under 'The Convention on Limitation of Liability 
for Maritime Claims'.244 
France continues that, should the shipowners have been a party to the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel, such owners' P&I Club insurers would have had a defence to their liability urtder the 
P&I Club rules; which was likewise contrary to the liability scheme.245 He sympathises with 
cargo-underwriters who, he believes, have the least control over classification society 
neglect. 246 Cane247 likewise considers the argument by the House of Lords regarding increased 
insurance costs to be unsound. He questions why the allocation of risks as between 
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shipowners and cargo-owners should be enforced as between cargo-owners and classification 
societies.248 He asserts:249 
'It seems to me prima facie undesirable and unfair that, while shipowners can incur 
liability to cargo-owners for failure to provide a seaworthy ship, classification societies 
bear no legal responsibility in tort for losses suffered by cargo-owners as a result of 
negligent failure by them to detect that a ship is unseaworthy'. 
He concedes, however, that classification societies will be forced to buy liability insurance 
should they not be able to pursuade shipowners to agree to an indemnity. 250 He maintains that, 
should classification societies be immune from non-contractual liability, they could function 
without insurance for third-party losses and could leave such parties to insure themselves with 
regard to losses that they could not recover from shipowners.251 
Lord Steyn proclaims that an important factor in The Ni~holqs If_ i~ ~h~t cla~~tfic~tio~ ~ocietj_es 
~ 'for _t~~~Ql~ctiye ~~lfare' a1_1~_ perfo_r_!ll !l _!.Ole_ w~ich would Qe fulfilled_ ~y _flag ~tat~s _i1_1 the!r 
absence.212 He is concerned that classification societies may adopt a more 'defensive position' - - ---- - - -- -
_sf!Qul~ they b~c<?me the _a!t~m~~~ target of cargo-owners in liability claims. 253 France254 
retorts: 
"If the concern for a more 'defensive' role means that classification surveyors will not 
permit vessels like the 'Nicholas H' to sail, then 'defensive' appears to be exactly what 
the industry wants". 
4.2.1.3 The dissenting judgement of Lord Lloyd 
In the House of Lords, Lord Lloyd acquiesces with the decision by Mr Justice Hirst in the 
Queen's Bench that there had been a very close degree of proximity between the classification 
surveyor and the cargo-owners. 255 Consequently, there was a duty of care on the classification 
society. The surveyor, as Lord Lloyd aptly states, 'must have been persuaded (my emphasis) 
to change his mind with regard to his initial decision that permanent repairs be effected'.256 He 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid at 374. 
250 Ibid at 375. 
251 Jbid. 
252 Supra 110te 3 at 316. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Op cit at 72. 
255 Supra note 3 at 303. 
256 Ibid at 302. 
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quotes Mr Justice Hirst, who speculated: 
'[T]he sanction imposed by his first report rendered it highly probable that the 
shipowner would not sail (as, in fact, occurred) in view of the dire effects that this 
would have on his insurance and on other common commercial arrangements such as a 
ship mortgage'.257 
Lord Lloyd continues by submitting that the withdrawal of the sanction would have had the 
opposite effect. 258 He then considers the absence of any means by the classification society of 
limiting its liability in tort. As no generalised duty of care is imposed upon clas:;;ification 
societies, but merely a decision based on the specific facts of the case, he does not consider 
that holding the classification society liable would lead to a 'floodgate' of claims against 
classification societies in general. 259 In his opinion, the test of 'proximity' would operate as an 
adequate safeguard against such undesirable· consequences. 260 
Lord Lloyd criticises Lord Justice Saville's statement in the Court of Appeal that the bill of 
lading contract, under which the cargo was carried, incorporated the Hague Rules and that it 
would therefore not be fair, just nor reasonable to impose an identical duty on a classification 
society to that imposed on a shipowner 'but without any of the balancing factors which are 
internationally recognised and accepted'. 261 He does not believe that the issues surrounding the 
Hague Rules bear much relevance to the issue of liability in this case. He reasons that the 
cargo could, for instance, have been carried by charter-party which would consequently have 
excluded the applicability of the Hague Rules. 262 He elaborates: 
'It would make nonsense of the law if a surveyor in a position of Mr Ducat owed a duty 
of care towards cargo if the contract of carriage were contained in a charter-party, 
which does not incorporate the Hague Rules, but not if it were contained in a bill of 
lading which does'. 263 
He disputes Lord Justice Saville's view in the Queen's Bench that the relationship between the 
surveyor and the cargo-owners was not sufficiently close to support a duty of care, as such 
cargo~owners were not even aware that the surveyor had been summoned and therefore could 
not have relied on anything that the surveyor did, or did not do. 264 Lord Lloyd employs the 
example of 'general average' to justify his viewpoint. He notes that a ship and her cargo are 
257 Supra note 217 at 499. 
258 Supra note 3 at 303. 
259 Ibid. 
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regarded as participating in a ~oint venture' and, had 'The Nicholas H's' repairs been successful 
in Puerto Rico and the voyage successfully completed, the cargo-owners would have had to 
contribute to the cost of the temporary repairs under 'The Yark-Antwerp Rules'. 265 Therefore, 
when the surveyor was utilised, he was acting as much in the interests of the cargo-owners as 
the vessel owners. 
Lord Lloyd dismisses the argument that it was not fair, just nor reasonable that classification 
societies should have an unlimited liability in tort, as opposed to shipowners who were entitled 
to limit their liability. 266 He refers to a similar argument raised in The TojoMaru261 where it 
was held that salvors were not entitled to limit their liability. As Lord Reid268 commented in 
this case: 
'I am bound to say that I have some sympathy with the respondents [the salvors] on the 
issue of limitation ofliability. But a Court must go by the provisions which have been 
agreed and enacted. If the special position of salvors was unforeseen, then we must 
avoid alteration of those provisions if those concerned see fit to make some alterations'. 
Subseqµently, some four years later, the limitation provisions were extended to cover salvors. 
Lord Lloyd disputes the relevance of the allegation that classification societies are 'charitable 
non-profit making organisations, promoting the collective welfare and fulfilling a 'public role' 
as he submits that remedies in the law of tort are not discretionary. 269 He cites the example of 
hospitals that are likewise charitable non-profit organisations, but that still owe a duty of care 
to their patients. 270 He contests the allegation that classification societies would not be able to 
survive financially should they be held liable in similar claims. He contends that the American 
Bureau of Shipping, a non-profit making classification society, had a 'nett' income of £1 I 
million in 1990 on operating revenues of£ 122 million, being a very healthy financial 
position. 271 
He asserts that no evidence was submitted that, to enforce liability on classification societies, 
would result in an extra layer of insurance being imposed. 272 He elaborates by pointing out 
that courts have 'traditionally' regarded the availability of insurance as irrelevant to the question 
as to whether a duty of care should be imposed on a particular party. 273 He submits that the 
265 Ibid at 307; Such Rules which are frequently utilised to cover 'general average'. 
266 Ibid at 308. 
267 (1971] 1 Lloyds Rep. 341; [1972] AC. 242. 
268 Ibid at 348. 






chief consideration should be that the cargo-owners suffered physical damage to their cargo, 
such damage which was caused by the classification surveyor's negligence and for which the 
classification society was responsible. 274 Consequently, Lord Lloyd would have permitted the 
appeal and restored the order in the Queen's Bench.275 He concludes by speculating: 
'More generally, I suspect that a decision in favour of the cargo-owners would be 
welcomed by members of the shipping community at large, who are increasingly 
concerned by the proliferation of sub-standard classification societies'. 276 
4.2.2 The Ramsgate Trial 
C ~ 
In a major development, Lloyd's Register classification society admitted ~minal liability for its c..,.,.,. .. ,.,.,_ / 
role in the collapse of a passenger ferry walkway at the UK port of Rams gate in September 
1994 during which 6 people were killed and 7 injured.277 Lloyd's Register pleaded guilty to 
the charge that it had failed to ensure the safety of the public under the UK Health and Safety 
Act. 278 This was the first criminal offence in the society's 237-year history. Lloyd's Register 
was ordered to pay a penalty of £500 000, with costs of £252 000. 279 Having one of the 
oldest, largest and most prestigious classification societies admitting liability could result in 
serious repercussions for other classification societies who are examining their liability 
exposure. The port ofRamsgate and two Swedish construction companies that were involved 
in the design and construction of the walkway, were likewise found guilty of failing to ensure 
the safety of the public. 
Mr Justice Clarke expressed that Lloyd's Register, or rather its employees, were guilty of 'gross 
negligence' in failing to inspect a passenger ferry walkway adequately. 280 He further contended 
thatj either Lloyd's Register's quality assurance systems had been inadequate, or the people 
responsible for their operation had failed, or both. 281 On the other hand, Mr Justice Clarke 
~cknowledged the important function which such society performed in the international 
community. 282 He found it significant that the society was regarded as a charity; had spent 
£17,5 million in 1996 on research, development and training; and that it had undertaken to 
amend its rules and procedures accordingly in the wake of the Ramsgate tragedy. 283 
214 Jbid at 309. 
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It is significant that Mr Justice Clarke believed that the port ofRamsgate, although it should 
have been aware of the potential risks, bore the lesser share of responsibility (likewise liability) 
due to its reliance on the expertise of, inter alia, the classification society. 284 Consequently, 
one may liken the position of the port ofRamsgate to that of a shipowner, which could result 
in increased liability claims against classification societies for negligence in conducting ship 
surveys. In a statement, Lloyd's Register deeply regretted the deaths and injuries suffered and 
declared: 
'Having considered the matter very carefully, [Lloyd's Register] has decided to enter a 
plea of guilty to the charge that, on this occasion, it did not comply fully with all of its 
respective classification rules'. 285 
The society faces potentially large claims by injured passengers and relatives of those killed in 
the misfortune. Chris Hobbs, a partner in the law firm 'Norton Rose', considers that Lloyd's 
Register's plea of guilty raises compelling questions as all other recent cases have absolved 
classification societies from liability towards third-parties.286 'Lloyd's List' comments with 
regard to-the above case: 
'Class societies have become imbued with the aura of invincibility. Seemingly immune 
to legal accountability, they have inspired antagonism amongst the maritime community 
... but the concept of class invincibility has been heavily dented'. 287 
This case brings home the reality that classification societies may be susceptible to unlimited 
liability claims from third-parties. Lloyd's Register maintains that it carries limited insurance 
cover for claims involving professional negligence, but that such insurance was costly and 
scarce. It was furthermore impossible to insure against every possible event. 288 Lloyd's 
Register, however, should be applauded for its response to this tragedy. 'Fairplay Editorial' 
expresses: 289 
284 Ibid. 
'A company can often be judged by the way it behaves when a mistake is made. 
[Lloyd's Register] has handled the matter with dignity and decency. It immediately 
accepted it was at fault and has carried out research which it believes has identified 
what went wrong'. 
285 Lloyds List 24 January 1997 at 1. 
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4.3 France 
4.3.1 Tlie Elodie Jp9o 
A French purchaser of a small vessel sued a classification society in tort for faults committed ;: vf-
(,.-a~ 1 f-J 
during various surveys of the vessel. During the latter part of 1988, Bureau Veritas JU-.-v<Cc:J.1) 
classification society conducted a special survey of the vessel and provided the relevant 
certificates. The future purchaser of the vessel requested that a surveyor from Bureau Veritas 
survey the vessel, such survey which was undertaken during the latter part of 1990 and the 
corresponding certificates were provided, After the French authorities had inspected such 
vessel; they withdrew its navigation license due to various defects which had clearly existed for 
several years. 
The 'Elodie II' was 'scrapped' after it was discovered that its required overhaul would be too 
costly. Bureau Veritas was subsequently sued for damages, financial injury and faults 
committed in maintenance of the vessel's classification during the special survey in 1988; a 
survey carried out in 1989 following a collision; and the pre-sale survey of 1990, Despite the 
fact that the vessel's 'class' had been suspended before its sale, the court held that this would 
not affect the position of the purchaser. 
The court concluded that the vessel's defects had existed for several years and had never been 
detected by Bureau Veritas. It _was.~eld that the vessel's classification had been incorrectly 
given and_~hat the classification society would have to provide compensation for the.'direct 
ha~m' suffered by th~ purc~aser. This decision was appealed against by both parties. On 
appeal, however, the judgement by the Nanterre Commercial Court was upheld in toto. This 
case provides support for the viewpoint that, in certain circumstances, negligent classification 
societies can and must be held liable in tort. 
- ~ ~ ' 
4.4 Belgium 
4.4.1 Tlie Spero29I 
this Belgium case involved the careless classification by a classification society of a river barge c~ r✓ 
which sank after a corroded input water pipe leaked. 'The Spero' was built in 1952 and was 
bought by a certain Mr Van Laken in 1982. Certain repairs were effected to the barge and, in 
May 1986, the vessel was classified as 'Class I' by its classification society, which would have 
2911 MIV E/odie II, Tribunal de Commerce de Nanterre, 26 Juin 1992, Revue Scape! 1992, 109, D.M.F. 1994, 
19; See Supra note 62 at 245. 
291 See Antwerp Court of Appeal (4e Ch) 14 February 1995. 
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been valid until 30 June 1988. 'The Spero' sank on 5 January 1987 with its owner claiming that 
it had collided with a sharp object. This contention was rejected by the court as it appeared 
that a corroded input water pipe was the cause of its sinking. It appeared that, even before 
loading, such vessel was unseaworthy. The barge had taken a few hours to sink andthe court 
was of the opinion that, should the normal safety measures have been taken by its skipper to 
keep it afloat, the sinking could have been prevented. It was argued that a water-pump could 
have been utilised to prevent such barge from flooding. 
It was held that the barge-owner could not shelter behind the classification work done by 
'Unitas' classification society and that the classification of the barge was insufficient proof that -~ the barge-owner had taken all the necessary measures to make his vessel seaworthy. It was 
further held that, by classifying the barge, the classification society did not execute that part of 
the barge-owner's contractual obligation 'to carry'. Therefore, the classification society would 
be regarded as a normal third-party towards the cargo interests. TEe court averred that a 
classification society had a general duty of due care to everyone who could be affected by its 
classification, including parties to whom it was not contracted, such as cargo-owners. ~ho_yld 
~· -- - - - -~ - -- -- - - . - . 
it have been careless in its classificaJton, it could be liable to injured parties. From an 'expert 
- -------- -- ·- . --- - --·- - -
report', it appeared that the classification society was not justified in granting 'Class 1' status to 
the barge. It was held that, during the last survey on 7 May 1986, too little attention had been 
paid to the water input pipe which, at that stage, must have been heavily corroded. 
\ The issuing of the 'Class l' certificate was deemed to be a professional fault and was seen as a 
breach of the general du~y of care on the part of t~e classification society. It was held that the 
. fault committed by the classification society had a 'causal connection' with the damage suffered 
by the vessel and that the granting of the classification certificate had kept the barge 
operational. It was held that the fact that a classification certificate was not regarded as 
absolute proof of the s~aworthiness of a vessel did not protect the classification society from 
liability due to the careless classification survey on its part. 
The court concluded that, had the barge-owner taken the necessary measures of control and 
prevention, the sinking of 'The Spero' could have been avoided. As the fault of both the barge-
owner and the classification society contributed to the same damages, the court held that they 
were both ~ointly and severally liable' for such damages. This case provides support f'or the -- --
assertion that negligent classification societies may be held liable towards third-parties in tort1 
in particular cargo-owners. 
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5. ARGUMENTS DISFAVOURING LIABILITY AGAINST CLASSIFICATION 
SOCIETIES 
5.1 The shipowner's non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel 
In The Gre(lt American292 the court stated that the civil responsibility for the welfare of a 
vessel and those on board, had always been the responsibility of the shipowner and not his 
classification society. The court argued that, consequently, a shipowner could not make a 
favourable survey or classification the basis of a 'due diligence' defence. 293 It was contended 
that, were favourable surveys and classifications permitted to operate as defences to the 
shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, the accountability of shipowners for the 
seaworthiness of their vessel would disappear.294 In many cases, should these defences be 
permitted, injured seamen and shippers of damaged goods would be left with inadequate 
remedies as it could be extremely difficult to obtain full compensation in these instances. The 
court in The Sundancer295 confirmed that there was a non-delegable duty ~n a shipowner to 
provide a seaworthy vessel for the purposes of transportation,by_sea. The shipowner likewise 
. -- ---- -~ 
has the responsibility of ensuring that his vessel is in compliance with national legislation and 
,...._ --~- - .. -- ~, . - - - - ~ - - - -· - _____ .... - - -~ 
international conventions. 
5.2 The classification society's brief contact with a vessel 
In The Great American296 the court contended that the recognition ofliability against 
classification societies would have the undesirable effect of placing the ultimate responsibility 
for the seaworthiness of vessels on organisations that had contact with vessels for brief annual 
periods, as opposed to shipowners who were permanently in contact with their vessels. The 
court further asserted that a classification society was unable to 'rectify' defects, merely being 
able to 'observe' and 'report' the result of its inspection to the shipowner or his 
representative. 297 
Furthermore, Hare298 maintains that the very system of classification is in need of change as it 
does not provide surveyors with sufficient opportunity to properly survey vessels. He 
292 Op cit at 1012. 
293 Ibid; Article III (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
294 Ibid at 1012. 
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amplifies this by questioning: 
'[C]an one surveyor, however competent, thoroughly inspect the vast hidden reaches 
of an ageing OBO, under pressure from owners and charterers and often at the risk of 
being buried under a relentless rising tide of bulk cargo being disgorged into the very 
spaces he is trying to inspect?'299 
Germanischer Lloyd classification society maintains that its surveyors are frequently told on 
board vessels that no time was scheduled for repairs in vessels' charterparties. 300 Such society 
contends that measures to ensure a ship's safety should not be sacrificed due to time 
constraints. 'Lloyds List' insists that it is important to take the huge size, complexity and 
enormity of a ship into account when considering holding classification societies liable for 
negligent surveys.301 
5.3 The classification society as absolute insurer of the vessels it surveys? 
lri The Great American302 the court declared that the recognition of a right of action against 
classification societies would have the effect of making such societies the absolute insurers of 
any vessels they surveyed and certified. It argued: 
'Not only is the liability not commensurate with the amount of control that a / 
classification society has over a vessel; it is also not in accord with the intent of the 1 
parties, the fees charged or the services performed'. 303 / 
Although Lord Lloyd in The Nicholas JP04 did not consider these fears to be legitimate, as 
noted previously Beck305 maintains that these concerns are genuine in the light of surveyors' 
fears of greater liability insurance and litigation costs. He believes that insurance premiums 
could be increased as, due to their limited number and potentially great exposure to maritime 
losses, classification societies could be viewed as a case of'bad insurance risk' should they not 
be protected by national legislation nor receive favour from the courts. 306 
The court in The Great American307 contends that, should classification societies effectively 
be made the absolute insurers of the vessels they survey, insurance companies could be putting 
299 Ibid at 63. 
300 Lloyds List 28 September 1996 at 7. 
301 5 March 1997 at 5. 
302 Op cit at 1012. 
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themselves out of business, such result which they surely did not intend bringing about. 
Honka308 maintains that, should classification societies be held liable, they would merely 
protect themselves through insurance coverage. In fact, many societies already have such 
coverage for liability. He alleges that such fault-based liability would generate the need for 
'doublewinsurance', which would entail increased premiums so as to cover the additional 
administrative costs. 309 Although Honka310 maintains that it would be inappropriate to 
exclude classification society liability completely in order to place the risk elsewhere, he 
speculates that holding classification societies strictly liable to avoid the need for insurance 
elsewhere would result in the 'financial collapse' of the classification system. 
5.4 A return to credibility? 
Due to the loss of credibility in classification societies, the IACS was formed to impr9ve the 
standards and reputation of societies. Presently, IACS members classify approximately 90% of 
the world's tleet.3i 1 More stringent rules by the IACS have restored confidence in 
classification societies, and the threat of suspension from classification by such societies for - --· . 
the J)ver-running' of condition and annual vessel surveys is a warning presently taken seriously 
by~sJ.ijp9~n~rs. 312- TheJACS impJeJTiente4 a mal!d~tory q~~lliy_£e_rtific_ation,system for _ _all its_ / 
rpembe~s _wh,ich_aspires_to_improv:e the_standard of shipp_ffig. 313 In 1993, the European 
Community ('EC') introduced a 'Proposal for a Council Directive on Commqn Rules,_apd __ 
Standards_fpr Ship Inspection and Survey Organisations' (the 'Proposal'),314 which has since 
~ --~ -·~ -~-- --
been approved ('the Directive').315 The Directive stipulates that solely governmentally 
- - - - -- ~- . - -
recognised classification societies are permitted to operate within the EC.316 The effect of this - - - ~ -- .. ~- - - - - -
is that, should a classification society be recognised in one EC state, other EC members 'should 
not' refuse to recognise vessel classifications by these societies. Consequently, there is ~----·----
uniformity amongst shippi!1g standar<!_s_ in ~C states, with only well-known classificati_2n 
-· - - ·- ---- _,_ - -- - - -- ------
societies being recognised by the EC member states.317 -- . - - - - ~----- ·- -~ ~---
'The Transfer of Class Agreement' ('TOCA') was introduced by the IACS, which aims to 
prevent 'class-hopping' by those shipowners who are either unwilling or unable to conform to 
308 Op cit at 34. 
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311 Lloyds List 12 June 1996 at l. 
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the requirements by IACS societies.318 In fact, three of the largest classification societies; 
namely: Lloyd's Register, American Bureau of Shipping and Det Norske Veritas declared their 
intention to withhold recognition from any ships whose classification surveys were overdue, 
and w9uld likewise not accept ships onto their registers that had failed to abide by the 
recommendations of other-classification societies.319 This approach has since been adopted by 
the remaining IACS members.320 
There has been an increasing number of vessels dropping out of the IACS and subsequently not 
being accepted by other IACS classification societies, that is allegedly eliminating substandard 
vessels.321 The Salvage Association, in fact, commented in 1996 on a general improvement in 
the quality of vessels inspected.322 It believed that efforts by classification societies and Port 
State Control to contain 'structural deficiencies' in vessels were having a positive effect. It has 
been claimed that none of 1995's vessel losses could be attributed to a failure in a vessel's 
structure, 323 
if airplay Editorial'324 alleges that the condition of the world's fleet appears better than first 
believed. One explanation is that the highest levels of repair activity and scrapping of vessels 
took place between 1991 and 1994, out of which some of the world's ageing and deteriorating 
fleet disappeared. Furthermore, The Enhanced Survey Programme ('ESP') was made a 
statutory requirement in July 1995.325 Since the introduction of ESP more than three years 
ago, it is alleged that no vessels have been found to be lost due to structural failure, which is 
said to be a tremendous achievement. 326 
As a result, classification societies argued that it was unnecessary to hold them liable as 
sufficient m~asures and controls were in place to assure their 'due diligence' in classifying and 
certifying vessels. 
31 8 Fairplay Editorial 20 February 1997 at 16. 
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320 The IRI Report, February 1996, Vol. 7, No. 1 at 2. 
321 Fairplay Editorial 5 September 1996 at 32. 
322 Lloyds List 6 August 1996 at 5. 
323 Sea Views, Vol. 6, No. 4, April 1996 at 25. 
324 4 January 1996 at 35. 
325 ESP is an intensified survey programme for tankers. This Programme was proposed by tanker owners 
following the IMO proposal that vessels aged over 17 years should be automatically phased out. 
326 Supra note 321. 
- 45 -
6. ARGUMENTS FAVOURING LIABILITY AGAINST CLASSIFICATION 
SOCIETIES 
6.1 Shipowners as clients of classification societies 
France327 asserts that '[t]he truth today is that the employers of class are the very segment of 
the industry which class was originally established to assess'. Hare328 likewise comments on 
this relationship: 
'And there is a potentially unhealthy relationship between the classification societies, the 
registers for which they survey and the shipowner: it is usually the shipowner who 
indirectly at least pays the bill of the surveyor who is to decree if a ship is seaworthy or 
not.' 
Dybeck, the chairman ofICB Shipping in Sweden, argues that banks and insurance companies, 
not shipowners, should be responsible for employing classification societies to assess the 
condition of ships329 as this will ensure the 'objectivity' of cbissification societies. Lindfelt330 
does not agree that classification societies should again be placed under the control of 
underwriters, but proposes that such societies be placed under the control of the IMO, with 
the shipowner still retaining his right to choose a classification society. In fact, a spokesperson 
for the IACS has warned the industry that, should classification standards deteriorate, the 
responsibility for surveying vessels may well be taken away from classification societies and 
transferred to the IMO. Some argue that holding classification societies liable will likewise 
encourage such societies to be more diligent in their surveys and improve classification society 
standards. 
6.2 A deteriorating condition of ships? 
In May 1995, 'Sea Views'331 commented that the IMO was concerned that their efforts to 
improve the safety of ships at sea were not paying dividends as the escalating number of 
maritirtle accidents suggested that many substandard vessels were trading without adequate 
maintenance. 'Fairplay Editorial' contended in February 1996 that there was a perception that 
ship standards were declining. 332 In January 1997, The Institute of London Underwriters 
reported that merchant shipping losses had, in fact, risen in 1996.333 The European 
327 Op cit at 71. 
328 Op cit at 63. 
329 Lloyds List 12 October 1996. 
330 'A future for Classification Societies' (1994) CMI YEARBOOK 253 at 254. 
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Commission is attempting to confirm reports relating to the existence of 'classification 
societies of convenience' that offer safe havens to substandard ships that have been dismissed 
by other societies.334 
Contrary to what some parties believe, 'Lloyds List'335 reports that shipping still faces problems 
with it's ageing fleet. Hare336 maintains that, although old ships are not necessarily 
substandard, the 'rule' is that the majority of ship losses involve older vessels. Contrary to the 
opinion of classification societies, 'Sea Views'337 is of the view that the majority of vessel 
founderings are attributable to structural failure. The fact that ship losses cannot be attributed 
to structural failure can rather be due to a lack of proof than a general improvement in 
shipping standards. This prompted Dr Helmut Schmen338 of the World Wide Shipping Group 
to declare that: 
"[They were] still in a crisis situation in the shipping industry with, for example, too few 
shipowners with 'the guts' to scrap inefficient, old vessels, ships in many sectors 
operating at freight rates below operating costs and the use of lower-cost manning 
being seen as the panacea for many of shipping's ills". 
In fact, there have recently been allegations that some classification society surveyors were 
open to bribery. In one instance a 'trap', posing as a shipowner, received assurance from a 
dassification surveyor that his society, and some of his Eastern European counterparts, could 
guarantee certificates of seaworthiness for the shipowner's vessels. 339 The imposition of 
liability against classification societies in general would arguably 'exterminate' these 
substandard societies. 
6.3 Competition between classification societies leading to lowered standards? 
Starer340 contends that the charging of fees for international convention certificates has become 
'big business' for classification societies. He is disconcerted that, as money-making entities, 
classification societies vie with each other for fees from shipowners for the performance of 
services that entail the enforcement of laws designed to protect life and property at sea. He 
334 Lloyds List 7 February 1997 at 3. 
335 2 July 1996 at 5. 
336 Op cit at 63-64. 
337 At 26. 
338 Bimco Bulletin, Vol. 91, No. 3, 1996 at 4. 
339 SeaViews Vol. 1, January 1996 at 14. 
340 Supra note 69 at 4. 
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elaborates:341 
'Somehow the world community has countenanced the emerging of governmental 
obligations to protect the public from undue risks of harm with market incentives which 
can blind many to the need for enhancement of the general welfare. This marriage of 
the governmental angel with the capitalistic devil (my emphasis) can threaten proper 
enforcement of the conventions'. 
There appears to be a lack of consistency amongst classification societies relating to the 
enforcement of adequate standards.342 Lindfelt alleges that there is a great variety even within 
the IACS regarding the size and quality of service of classification societies.343 The chairman 
of ABS, Frank Iarossi, rejects the notion that heightened competition between classification 
Societies carries risks oflowered standards. He insists: 344 
'On the contrary. It drives us to innovate, it drives us to improve our systems, and now 
that we have port states releasing information, it drives us to make sure that we are the 
best'. 
The recent tragedy of the 'Leros Strength', a bulker which sank with her twenty Polish crew off 
Norway on 8 February 1997, has cast doubt regarding the effectiveness of the TOCA and the 
standards of certain IACS members. 345 On 12 June 1996, The Registro Italiano Na vale, an 
Italian classification society and member of the IACS, accepted the transfer of the 'Leros 
Strength' from ABS, another IACS member. As ABS had refused a three-month extension of 
the vessel's certificates due to her condition, the owner simply changed classification societies, 
with tragic consequences. This was the classic case scenario which the TOCA was supposed 
to avert. 'Fairplay Editorial'346 assert that, '[w]ith the sinking of the Leros Strength, it has been 
shown that the safeguards of class and of the world's maritime authorities have failed at every 
level.' It proposed that a 'Super IACS' be created involving The American Bureau of Shipping, 
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai, D~t Norske Veritas and Lloyd's Register to 'take IACS by the scruff of 
the neck and use it to impose a new regime'. 347 
341 Ibid. 
342 the lRI Report, February 1996, Vol. 7, November 1 at 2. 
343 Op cit at 254. 
344 Lloyds List, Africa Weekly, 14 June 1996. 
j 45 Fairplay Editorial 27 February 1997 at 3. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid at 4. 
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6.4 A Shipowner's non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel? 
The terms of the International Safety of Life at Sea ('SOLAS') Convention and the Load-Lines 
Convention are very complex and shipowners simply do not have the expertise to oversee or 
conduct such surveys. Consequently, shipowners pay large fees to classification societies to 
conduct such surveys. 
Starer348 contends that the reason why courts stress the non-delegable duty of a shipowner to 
provide a seaworthy vessel is so as to ensure that injured parties will have a 'deep pocket' from 
which to obtain compensation. He questions the reason why, after compensating injured 
parties, shipowners should be barred from suing commercial entities (classification societies) 
whose negligence caused their damages. 349 
Starer is of the view that, regarding compliance with international conventions, the shipowner 
is an ineffective protector of the 'public interest' as he will always attempt to comply with the 
conventions in the most cost-effective manner. He argues that an entity other than shipowners 
(namely classification societies) must ensure that convention requirements are met as 
shipowners do not have the technical resources, nor the economic motivation to do so.350 
Shipowners may be deemed to have the non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, but 
rely very heavily upon classification societies to assist them in fulfilling their obligations. 
6.5 The failure of Flag State Control 
It is said that the primary responsibility for the safety and operation of ships rests with their 
flag states and with the classification societies that they sometimes engage.351 Lord Donaldson 
asserts: 
'In an ideal world Flag States, whose flags are worn by the world's shipping, would lay 
down, and enforce upon their own shipowners, standards of design, maintenance and 
operation which would ensure a very high standard of safety at sea ... the present 
system of Flag State Control falls well short of this ideal.'352 
Due to the failure of flag states to fulfil their duties in this regard, many states have resorted to 
the 'policing' of these standards, commonly known as Port State Control ('PSC'). This relates 
not only to those vessels flying their flags, but likewise to vessels of other states that enter their 
348 Supra note 69 at 6. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Donaldson op cit at xxvi. 
352 Ibid.at 57. 
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ports. Whilst PSC has redressed some of the problems resulting from substandard shipping, it 
is not seen as a substitute for proper flag state control. 353 As classification societies act as -
agents for flag states, they are entitled to immunity from legal suits where a society acts on 
gehalf of a flag state, and the state provides such immunity._ The granting of this immunity is 
said to maintain the independence of classification societies and to ensure that their services are 
available at a reasonable cost. 354 
Flag states must resist the temptation to overlook vessel deficiencies in order to attract and 
retain vessels on their registers. It is clear that flag states fail to properly monitor the extent to 
which their authorised classification societies are performing their duties effectively. Starer355 
maintains that holding flag states to a 'higher duty of care' is an unrealistic way of protecting 
the public interest. 356 He argues that many flag states could not be expected to develop the 
knowledge and administration necessary to monitor the performances of their classification 
societies. 357 It is likewise beyond the financial means of many 'flag of convenience' states. He 
concludes by asserting that, 'if societies were exposed to significant civil liability for negligent 
performance of their services, there would probably be far fewer unsafe vessels'. 358 
7. THE WAY FORWARD 
7.1 The initiative by The Comite Maritime International 
'A Joint Working Group on a Study oflssues re Classification Societies' ('CSJWG') was 
constituted in 1992 upon the initiative of 'The Comite Maritime International' ('CMI'), an 
international maritime law association. 359 The issues that were considered were thRegal 
rights, duties and liabilities of classification societies, as well as t~lationship between 




/,;,/q'J ,:,:t1 a 
classification societies and shipowners. Representatives from the IACS; 'The International 
Group of P & I Clubs'; 'The International Chamber of Shipping' ('JCS'); 'The International 
Chamber of Commerce' ('ICC'), 'The International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners' 
('INTERCARGO') participated in the discussions, with 'The International Maritime 
Organisation' ('IMO') and 'The International Union of Marine Insurers' ('IUMI') attending as 
observer~. 
/ 353 Ibid. 
/ 354 Leslie 'Civil Responsibilities of vessel owners and classification socielies'. (1994) CMI YEARBOOK 256 at 
257. 
355 Supra note 69. 
356 Ibid at 7. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Binico Bulletin, (1996), Vol. 91, No. 2 67. 
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The CMI was concerned with the escalating frequency of claims against classification societies c .na ~ = 
as additional 'deep pocket' defendants. 360 It was feared that, consequently, classification 
"i' CI IJ ,, (J -I 
c..S 
societies would have to withdraw some of their services, leading to a deterioration in vessel 
safety standards. Frank Wiswall, 361 the Chairman of the CSJWG, contends that disastrous 1~~- ,"(/ .c-.r 
results could ensue should classification societies not enjoy limited liability. He explains that, co~ r& ~-
should limited liability not be provided, insurers would apply pressure on classification societies n." •~,~-:: 
to adapt their operations so as to minimise their exposure to 'danger areas'. As noted earlier, 
the CSJWG maintains that 'one of the sources of difficulty has been what societies do, and how f/Ll:J-=- 0--c,t 
and on whose behalf they do it, is not set forth to the general public in any uniform manner'. 362 ,~;:,,_~ 0 
Consequently, the CSJWG drafted 'Principles of Conduct for Classification Societies' setting di c . s f'"' 
out the standards that could be employed to measure the conduct of a classification s~ty in a 
stipulated case. Should it be demonstrated that a classification society adhered to such ~-rr ~ ..c,/~'J' 
standards, this would be held as prima facie evidence that such society, being implicated in a 
case of maritime injury, had not acted negligently. 363 The CMI's project is viewed as 'breakin$ 
~_ground!-as it may provide an internationally recognised 'yardstick' to assess classification jA J -
' ..c. 364 ° <'1 ",,,..d, ,,,I society pe11ormances. v ) · 
. 
~lieved!~at_classification societies sheuld be brought within the ambit of& j'""' r?. 
Convention on the Limitationoft:iability for Maritime Claim(J65 The CSJWG views tliis as st"~;~ . ....: 
a long-term possibility, but maintains that itwiU-take-too1ong to implement in view of the ..----4,,~ -' 
present concerns relating to the potential liability of classification societies.366 With regard to 
such liability, however, the CSJWG testifies that: 
'With regard to the exposure of the Classification Societies to claims both by 
shipowners and by third-party plaint!ffs (my emphasis), it is imgortant to note at the 
outset that there has been no attempt to give the Societies any immunity from suit (my 
emphasis) upon a claim arising out of activities related to the Rules; it is a strongly~ 
held view within the Group that civil litigation and I or the threat of litigation (my 
emphasis) operates as a spur to awareness of the damaging consequences of certain 
acts or omissions'. 367 
The Group argues that the service provided to_a_v.ess~l,_and_n_oJ_~ shii:>'s tonnage,_pr.o_yj_des tl_!~_ 
fairest and most accurate basis upon which to calculate a limitation of liability for classification 
360 Ibid. 
361 Lloyds List 24 January 1997 at 5. 
362 Supra note 359. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Supra note 361. 
365 Of 1976; and the 1996 Protocol. 
366 Supra note 359 at 68. 
367 Ibid. 
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societies.368 This monetary value is measured by utilising the fee payable by a shipowner; and -=----limiting a classification society's liability to a multiple of the fee charged by the society, such 
multiple which is nominated by the classification society. 369 Lindfelt of 'The Swedish P & I 
Club' concedes that the only viable solution is that liability should be geared towards the fees 
charged, but asserts that the amount at risk for classification societies must be 
'considerable'. 370 He protests that the liability limit proposed by classification societies is 
'ridiculously low' and urges P & I Clubs to resist such limit which is to the disadvantage of 
shipowners. 371 He provides the example of a shipowner who is found guilty of transgressions 
caused by the negligence of a classification society. He maintains that such owner will b~ 
penalised under the limited liability regime but, when he attempts to recover his loss from the µ, ~ 
classification society, he will be faced with a party with a lesser liability limit and will suffer --', /;'!J 
loss even though he is not at fault. 372 CJ. C c:Cs 
,v_J 
Owners and insurers contend that classification society liability should be based upon a vessel's 
tonnage, as stipulated in the 1976 Convention.373 Classification societies dismiss this notion, 
however, by maintaining that the tonnage regime is unacceptable as it does not reflect the 
amount or type of work undertaken by such societies.374 It could, for instance, take the same 
amount of time to inspect and survey a smaller vessel as it could for a larger ship. A proposal 
to consider a classification society limitation of 50% the amount in the 1996 Protocol375 was 
rejected by classification societies that contended that there were vast differences between their 
responsibilities, and those of shipowners. Shipowners, they allege, still have the duty to 
provide seaworthy vessels. 
A suggested compromise is that the fee-based system be regulated in such a way that a 
~
shipowner may increase a classification society's liability to a higher multiple of the fee, should 
the shipowner be prepared to pay an additional amount. The writer believes that, however, 
should payment of an 'additional amount' result in a more thorough survey by a classification 
society, this 'suggestion' should be completely redressed as one should not be permitted to 
gamble with the safety of lives at sea out of a payment for a ship survey. A seafarer has the 
right to be guaranteed a completely thorough survey, irrespective of the fees paid to a 
classification society. Should he not be afforded this right, he may become one of the 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Op cit at 255. 
371 Supra note 361. 
312 Ibid. 
373 Convention on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims of 1976; and the 1996 Protocol. 
314 Supra note 361. 
375 Ibid; Supra note 365. 
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excessive number of seafarers who lose their lives each year on substandard vessels, owned by 
substandard shipowners and classified by substandard classification societies. 
The reason why classification societies wish to alter the status quo is that, although they have 
recently been seemingly immune to liability, it is generally believed that a society could shortly 
be sued successfully in a large case, which could result in the society losing its immunity and 
being vulnerable to unlimited liability claims from third-parties.376 Societies also face 
retribution from disgruntled shipowners that are furious that IACS societies originally provided 
classification to their bulk carriers, such vessels that they now refuse to classify. j 77 
In 'The Principles of Conduct for Classification Societies', it is stipulated that classificatiort 
societies ate deemed to stand 'independent of shipowners'. 378 The w~iter is of the opinion that, = cf,./~ 
in reality, no party is able to stand wholly 'independent' of the party which pays its fees, 
irrespective of the terms of the agreement between them. Furthermore, in the 'Model 
Contractual Clauses' between classification societies and governments,379 it is specified that 
the 'duties and functions' of classification societies 3re to be agreed upon between the two 
parties.· We have already noted the failure of flag states to regulate and control the activities of 
their authorised classification societies, and it is questionable whether the position would be 
any different in this instance. Legislative immunity provided by their authorising states could 
likewise absolve classification societies from liability. 
James Be!!, the IACS permanent secretary, is not optimistic that an international convention 
;ill emerge out of the CMI discussions as h~oes nott;;lieve that it is high on the 'priority list' . .:f :. I° .,.,;..,.i., 
~ ffd'vf-t, 
of governments. 380 Another perceived weakness in the CMI initiative is that, although it -
focuses on the contractual relationships, it does not deal with third-party claims, 381 such claims 
which are escalating and that enjoy less legal certainty than contractual claims. { f t..l, :o Uvt:t:. 
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7.2 The role of Port State Control 
Hare382 contends: 
'It is in the concept of port state control that the maritime community worldwide has) 
seen a possible solution to the problem of the substandard ship. Not the solution, buJ (\(fl) 
rather one of the more positive steps which can be taken - and necessary because the/ · 
prime obligation of the shipowner and his register have been too often neglected'. :J 
Lord Donaldson384 maintains that the long-term goal should be to improve the standard of flag -ft,?,1 -{(71-t( 
state control in order to ensure that international rules are complied with. As long as such flag ::::- l'-t6 
state control is ineffective, Port State Control ('PSC') is viewed as the United Kingdom's first 
· line of defence_ against the pollution of her coastline.385 flarke likew~se believes that PSC is 
not an alternative to flag state control, but rather a means of compellmg owners of substandard 
vessels to either 'scrap' such vessels, or to bring them up to standard.3:}he flag state is still 
the entity where the prime duty of the enforcement of international conventions rests. 
However, we have witnessed the failings of flag states to properly enforce international fL, Zc-ve ,J rs c.. 
fo ~- IN~ 
conventions and national legislation. Clarke387 maintains that some of the complaints regarding 
the effectiveness of flag state control relate to the role performed by classification societies. f'JZ.,c16 -=- _;::; 
C-S. 
He contends that most flag states rely on classification societies to inspect vessels flying their 
flags, but that not all societies apply their rules with the same strictness. Q_his has resulted in 
{ 
1 v-ftu, C 'T 
some shipowners leaving 'stricter' classification societies for more 'lenient' ones, with the ve,;,,.t, 
ensuing lowering of standards) As a result, port states commenced taking steps to protect their 7-..~-.} 
coastlines. It.... J 1 . ---
There is optimism concerning the potential of PSC, primarily due to the experiences of the 
~ 'Paris Memorandum of Understanding on PSC' ('MOU'). The MOU is a regional 
experiment which provides a strategy for combatting substandard ships, by inspecting a cert.ain 
percentage of vessels passing through a member state's ports. Each member of the MOU aims 
to inspect at least 25% of all foreign vessels utilising its ports each year. 388 Although the MOU 
has only been seen to be a 'conditional' success, it has highlighted the problem of substandard J 
382 Op cit 
383 Ibid at 67. 
384 Op Cit. 
385 Ibid at 135. 
386 Clarke 'Port State Control or sub-standard ships: who is to blame? what is the cure? (May 1994) Lloyds 
Maritime and Commercial Quarterly 202 at 205. 
387 Ibid at 204. 
388 Lloyds List 28 September 1996 at 7. 
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shipping and has brought about regional co-operation in attempting to root out such 
substandardness. 389 
~Ms recently launched a stricter era of PSC. Owners of detained vessels shall now be (. ~ : 
a•.,.:: f <c+-h(lll-named and held liable for the costs of such inspections. 390 There shall likewise be new 11~. 
\""- <errG' ~ 
priorities for vessel inspections. Ships that ~OU ports for the first time, or that have been , "''f2<t"...r 
~m such ports for a year shall be inspected first. According to the old system, 
surveyors inspected vessels according to the deficiency and detention rates of each particular 
flag. 391 The MOU publishes its vessel detention statistics and indicates which classification 
societies are responsible for classifying and certifying detained vessels. However, due to 
pressure from classification societies, the MOU shall now solely identify classification societies 
where the failure to report vessel deficiencies is the fault of such societies. 392 The fau:Qpeap 
Commission, together with the IACS, shall shortly draw UJ2 far::r_e.a.chingJJ)~asures that will 
_111_ake classification societies responsible for t4_e_ii:__~_bi.p_pwnei:_s' safety actions. 393 A spokesman 
ofDet Norske Veritas disclosed to 'Lloyds List': 
'The European Commission has said it will use port state control detention figures as a measure vtd--L f1Jl. 
of the effectiveness of classification societies ... We believe that port state control offers an k-r"' t1jv,. 
effective contribution to increasing vessel quality and in increasing pressure on all players to TI> J""'virfJ 
improve'. 394 {__ f ~<>(t -
With regard to PSC in South Africa, 'Sea Views' reports: 
'Port state inspections in South Africa are grinding to a halt, a lack of funding, and - ~l '~ 
therefore manpower, is seriously prejudicing the country's ability to police shipping'.395 uA • 
The South African government appointed 'Hermes Consulting' to draft a proposal for the 
formation of a commercial maritime safety authority as, inter alia, th~ South African ·<{k (di., 
Department of Transport was unable to achieve even a 10% inspection rate of vessels utilising I I.,< 1~<-11" 
- l~ South African ports; falling far short of the minimum international requirement of 25%.396 
This unsatisfactory position is primarily due to a shortage of qualified surveyors as a result of 
the low civil service wages. It is hoped that a South African commercial maritime safety 
389 Payoyo 'Implementation of international conventions through port state control: an assessment' (1994) 18 
Marine Policy 379 at 392. 
39° Fairplay Editorial 4 July 1996 at 18 citing European Union Directive 95/21. 
391 Fairplay Editorial 4 July 1996. 
392 Lloyds List 7 February 1997 at 3. 
393 Ibid. 
394 Ibid. 
395 1996, Vol. 6, No. 5 at 17. 
396 Lloyds List 2 July 1996 at 12. 
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authority will be able to redress this critical situation. South Africa must ensure that the new 
authority succeeds in establishing effective PSC in South Africa. Should it fail, the South 
African coastline will become the 'dumping- ground' for the world's substandard shipping, due ~ t{l5 (--a 
to the non-threat of ship detentions. Proficient PSC in South Africa will likewise function in 
ensuring that classification societies maintain their standards, failing which substandard 
societies may have their authorisation terminated by the government. 
7 .3 The implications of The International Safety Management Code 
Statistics demonstrated that 70% to 90% of shipping accidents were caused by 'human 
error'.397 It was realised that there was an important 'relationship' between ships and their Ar,tl"e;_ ,r<~~! _r,_c.<, 
'( --- 0"" tf'l f- L...--i: L,.-
managements. As such, the 'human element' on both sides had to be of a high standard. 'The .,,,,,,,.,.0 7 ,.., 
International Safety Management Code' ('ISM')398 was introduced by the 'International .:i:- .r vvi ( :r: t,1.,t ~ 
Maritime Organisation' ('IMO') to combat this problem. ISM will become effective as part of 
Chapter IX ofthe---j-974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention ('SOLAS'), such Convention which 
regulates approximately 96% of the world's merchant tonnage. The mission of the ISM Code CM., r,,-. 
,-------- --· ·-·· ------ •---- ,:: .... (YV\'-1-
is to eradicate all 'human error' from ship management ashore and ship operations afloat7 .e...........,_ 
I 
Shipowners s_hall have to comply with the requirements of ISM by no later than 1 July I 998 for 
passenger ships, oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high-speed 
of 500 gross tonnage and over; and for the remainder of cargo ships by 1 July 2002. 399 
Classifica · ~ocieties may now be required by flag states to inspect the 'whole safety aspect' 
of an organisatkm, including separate management arrangements. 400 
\ 
Captain Roger Clipsham,401 the general secretary of 'The International Federation of 
~ .::F--rS vt., /I 
Shipmasters Association'~('IFSMA'), is concerned that many flag states who have the "'c .,...,......,_,.___ (l,,._,,_-r 
responsibility of issuing ISM "2ei:t;ificates to vessels on their registers delegate their statutoryF-s c. := f nL, · 
survey work to organisations whose personnel have low levels of qualifications. He insists · · 2 °5 ~ 
J...J VV1 
that solely IACS registered classification societies should be authorised to act on behalf of flag c:.e_,_ ti/'J 
states in this regard. 'The Australian Maritime Safety Authority' ('AMSA') has delegated its 
initial ISM verification work to classification societies, but insists that it will strictly monitor 
their performances. 402 
397 Biti1co Bulletin, Vol. 91, No. 3 of 1996 at 5; 'human error' as opposed to structural or mechanical failure of 
a vessel. 
398 International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention, November 4, 
1993, Res. A 741 (18). 
399 Honk.a op cit at 5. 
400 Ibid at 4 - 5. 
401 Lloyds List 29 July 1996. 
402 Fairplay Editorial, LSM, October 1995 at 11. 
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Captain Joyce, a marine manager at 'The International Chamber of Shipping' ('ICS'), believes >CJ 
that classification societies will be playing a major role in the accreditation of the ISM Code 
and should strive to maintain sufficient independence between their traditional classification 
and ISM auditing work. 403 The sub-director of Secnaves, the body responsible for the 
oJJ-'2--.IJ 
management of the Panamanian ship register, declares that the ISM Code will provide such ., ..... vt-c.i.. 1 J 
body with new 'criterion' with which to assess the suitability of new classification societies, and cs 
that they shall have 'a good look' at some of their current societies. 404 Det Norske Veritas 
reported that, by June 1996, merely two and a half percent of the world's fleet had been ISM 
Code accredited and, with solely two years before the Code became mandatory, 'alarm bells' 
were ringing in the industry.405 It appears that the possibilities of the IMC waiving the ISM 
requirements beyond July 1998 are remote as it has insisted that no extensions to the deadline 
shall be provided.406 
The introduction of the ISM C_o_de substantially increases the risk of liability falling on Y[ 1/"A- c ~ --shipowners amt-shipmanagers. By int1oducing-for-ma1-management systems into ship 0 v,At._ .J·fl,,~· :::i 
operations, ISM is likely to provide third-parties with more documentary evidence to prove A_t t, r:-y ~ 
that shipowners have failed to guarantee the seaworthiness of their vessels.407 (riA
7 
d~J 1. 
There is much debate concerning the value ofISM certification. Some parties are concerned 
by the perceived incompetency of flag states to administer the ISM provisions effectively. 
Chris Wade, the chief surveyor of Lloyd's Register, is perturbed that flag states have the 
ultimate responsibility of ensuring that their convention obligations are met, but appear 
reluctant to do so.408 Others are troubled that the role of classification societies is becoming 
'omnipresent.1409 Timothy Lietzill, president of 'ABS Marine Service', alleges that the vital 
( ~
flaw of the ISM system is that standards are set by eac ..wmpany;-an 
~
IA/'<>,,.,...p/,.J:Z ,_....., \I 
 410 He elaborates by pointing out that~e . ired for safety 
instructions and manuals. Samuel Cooperman, president of 'Stolt Parcel Tankers' believes that· 
403 Fairplay Editorial, LSM, August 1996 at 42. 
404 Fairplay Editorial, A Supplement to LSM, October 1995 at 7. 
405 Lloyds List 14 June 1996 at 6. 
406 Ibid. 
407 lbid at 3. 
4°8 Lloyds List 24 Jm1e 1996 at 5. 
409 Ogg 'IMO's International Safety Management Code (1996) 3 The International Jourtial of Shipping Law 
143 at 151. 
4Hi Fairplay Editorial 30 May 1996 at 19. 
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ISM should concentrate on other important issues. He explains: 
'Instead of focusing only on 'ships of shame' or even 'flag states of shame', far more 
would be gained by focusing on 'shippers of shame' and 'ports of shame' and 
'classification societies of shame'. You would be astonished how fast bad ships would 
go out of circulation and good ships would flourish in the market'.411 
The 'human element' is of vital importance in shipping and the writer is of the opinion that c..r ,r~Jd 
classification societies should be held liable for negligence in their ISM accreditation work, ::: (,"" i;: 0 
which will assist in assuring vigilance on the part of societies in this crucial area. 
7 .4 Future proposals 
The writer concurs with the ~SJWG's belief that th~ation functions as a 
motivation to classification societies to operate responsibly and cautiously.412 Until recently, 
classification societies have appeared immune against liability for negligence committed by c S ;:. 
their surveyors. However, the recent outcome of the Ramsgate Trial and the Elodie II ~ '<l-v<'~~◄ 
decision confirms the 'widely held [view] that each lawsuit brings closer the day when a society ~ 
will be sued successfully in a major case.'413 
The writer believes that surveyors should be provided with sufficient time and opportunity to 
inspect vessels. This issue should be addressed in the agreements between classification 
societies and governments. A shipowner or charterer should not be permitted to place 
pressure on surveyors to 'expedite' their classification and certification duties. At the same 
time, however, the free-flow of shipping should not be impeded by over-extensive surveys, 




<JV-c,,l_d, <A<f( J 
t.cO<A j 
interest that the shipping industry remain healthy, as the overwhelming majority of the world's 
trade is effected by these immense vessels, notably being the 'largest man-made moving 
objects'. The IACS should be commended for its implementation of the TOCA In the light of, 
the recent 'Leros strength' tragedy, however, such organisation must restore its reputation by 
tightening up its control and discipline amongst its members. 
The limitation of liability regime must be amended to incorporate and protect classification 
societies. Why should a shipowner, who is said to have the responsibility of providing a 
seaworthy vessel, be protected financially by a limitation regime, whereas the classification 
society which he employs to survey his vessel enjoys no such cover? Consequently, many 
parties &ue classification societies because of their unlimited liability exposure. Classification 
411 Fairplay Editorial 14 November 1996 at 37. 
412 Supra note 359 at 68. 
413 Supra note 361 at 5. 
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societies wish to fall under the limitation of liability regime; but correctly maintain that this may 
not be achieved in the near future. 414 At the same time, however, classification societies do 
not want their liability to be based on a ship's tonnage, as utilised in 'The Convention on 
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims',415 as they do not believe that this accurately 
reflects the amount of work undertaken by societies. 416 The writer is of the opinion that the 
~would be to base classification society liability on the fees charge.d.hµu~c~h~-
societies. ---
'Disclaimers ofliability', exempting classification societies ab initio from liability due to their 
negligence, should be declared void by the courts as being contrary to public policy. In fact, "' 
tZ()<l'---:J?<" 
courts refuse such exemption clauses for negligence on bills of ladi- c/:.Jc s 
provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules. 417 It would be unfair to place classification societies in a[cUft-i-6 
more favourable position than shipowners with regard to disclaimers ofliability. The writer is h_,,.&_ cs 
•rv.. vV-~ 
of the viewpoint that, should the limitation of liability regime be amended to include ~.,,"ti~ 
classification societies, the necessity for disclaimers of liability on the part of societies will 
disappear. 
The CMI initiative relating to the formulation o( 'Principles of Conduct for Classification -r<re 
j_Qg.etie.s' and 'Model Contractual Clauses'418 is a positive step. The wnter mamtains that 'to 
o-f"-,1 
cut the Gordian knot that, since 1880, has bound classification societies to their shipowner r 
clients'419 is an unrealistic view and it is furthermore doubtful whether marine insurers would 
once again be in a position to 'employ' classification societies. 
At the same time, however, the amounts for which classification societies may be held Hable for 
~i,..'( ""'-'' ,.:.i 
their negligence must be adequate and considerable as various parties have 'expressed fears that wt /4e. 




414 Supra note 359 at 68. 
415 Of 1976; and its 1996 Protocol. 
416 Supra note 361 at 5. 
417 The l-Iague Rules as amended by the Brussels Protocol 1968; Article III (8): 
'Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for 
loss or damage to, or in connection with, goods arising from negligence, fault or failure in the duties and 
obligations provided in this article or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in these Rules, shall be 
null and void and ofno effect (my emphasis). A benefit of insurance in favour of the carrier or similar clause 
shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier from liability'. 
418 Supra note 359. 
419 Supra i10te 10 al 377. 
420 Supra nole 361. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Classification societies unquestionably play a vital role in the shipping industry. They are relied 
upon by many parties, not the least of which are seafarers, and their extinction could b¢ to the rrl"-€-o{ 
detriment of everybody, not only those reliant on shipping for their livelihood. Consequently, ft,v'c;s · 
courts have been reluctant to hold classification societies liable for negligent surveys, being 
concerned that the costs of damage may be shifted to 'a relatively minor actor' in the shipping 
industry which, in turn, could lead to classification societies withdrawing some of their survey 
services.421 
i/j 
On the other hand, however, should classification societies be absolved completely from ~ J"t.¼-Q_ 
liability for negligence, the writer contends that this would lead to a relaxation in classification l~ ~ ~-~ 
society standards and a deterioration in the seaworthiness of vessels. Although cases such as 
The Sundancer422 and The Nicholas H423 absolved the classification societies from liability 
many parties were disillusioned by these verdicts that were viewed as over-favourable towards 
classification societies.424 The reason for a vessel's classification certificate is not merely to 
permit a shipowner to take advantage of insurance rates, although being one of the important 
reasons for such survey. Any belief otherwise would make a mockery of the very system of 
classification, as well as being insulting towards the role played by classification societies. 
There is likewise the very real threat of overage shipping. Many overage ships will be removed 
from operation due to the worldwide tightening in ship safety requirements. In the interim, 
however, unscrupulous shipowners will attempt to extract as much 'charter-hire' and 'freight' as 
possible from these vessels with little concern for the safety of their seafarers or the 
preservation of the world's coastlines. Flag states, supported by their authorised classification 
societies, cannot and must not permit these unseaworthy vessels to continue to ply the world's 
trade, irrespective of the fees which they may stand to lose. The international community 
must apply pressure on flag states to fulfil their international convention responsibilities1 failing 
which sanctions should be imposed on reneging states. 
The Ramsgate Tria/425 and The Elodie/1426 decisions appear to indicate a sway of opinion 
against the apparent immunity of classification societies. The recent sinking of the 'Leros 
Strength' has likewise exposed weaknesses in the regulation of 'class' transferrals by the lACS. 
It is unfortunate that the maritime industry only appears to effect policy changes to shipping 
421 Supra note 69. 
422 Supra note 159. 
423 Supra note 210. 
424 France op cit. 
425 Supra note 277. 
426 Supra note 289. 
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safety following a shipping tragedy involving a major loss oflife. As the issue o~ 
becomes more prevalent in various jurisdictions and, as the world becom -~~=:::-, e to the 
perceived devastation of our planet, the international community shall have o resolve the 
current disorder relating to classification society liability in order to, inter alia, protect the 
rights of seafarers and to prevent the denigration of our 'blue planet'. 
p, C 
Ideally, flag states should be held more accountable for the actions of vessels flying their flags. u 
Sadly, many states are solely intent on procuring as many vessels as possible and consequently 
'relax' their standards so as to entice vessels onto their registers, irrespective of their condition. 
Flag states must not be permitted to provide their authorised classification societies with 
legislative immunity for negligent surveys, as this undermines the very responsibility of such 
states to ensure the safety of life and property at sea. Although many shipowners act 
responsibly and commendably, there are regrettably others who merely utilise 'substandard' 
classification societies for convention and insurance purposes, and are prepared to 'shop' for 
the least expensive such societies. Such unscrupulous shipowners should not, in these 
circumstances, be held by courts to have fulfilled their non-delegable duty of providing 
seaworthy vessels. 
1t is sincerely hoped that the CMI initiative will succeed in bringing about an international 
convention from its deliberations. Irrespective of its outcome, however, this initiative has 
stirred up a welcome general debate regarding the provision of incentives to classification 
societies to improve the safety of life and property at sea. Governments shall have to, 
however, become actively involved in this initiative for it to accomplish its ideals. The last 
word in this paper shall be entrusted to Starer427 who befittingly sums up this initiative: 
'Perhaps the existence of standards and absence of varying degrees of immunity will enable the 
courts to understand what it is that classification societies are responsible for and to overcome 
their fear that classification society liability will disturb waters only the courts perceive as 
tranquil'. 
427 Supra note 107. 
